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Judges are too often inclined to fold their hands and blame the 
legislature, when they really ought to set to work to give the words a 
reasonable meaning, even if this does involve a departure from the 
letter of them.  By so acting they are more likely to find the truth. 
Lord Denning¥ 
President Barack Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act
1
 on March 23, 2010.  The legislation, arguably 
President Obama’s signature achievement, enacted sweeping changes to 
the health care industry.  The Act, among its many provisions, mandates 
health insurance coverage, expands Medicaid, establishes insurance 
exchanges, enacts changes to Medicare, introduces preventive health 
programs, and subjects individuals and employers to a number of 
penalties, taxes, and other assessments.
2
  The legislation has generated 
significant controversy in the past five years.  The Supreme Court, in a 
trilogy of highly publicized cases, upheld a significant part of the Act in 
the face of a constitutional challenge but also struck down certain 
provisions on both constitutional and statutory grounds. 
In 2012, the Court upheld what was perhaps the most contentious 
provision in the legislation—the so-called individual mandate, which is 
the requirement that individuals obtain health insurance coverage or face 
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 1.  Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
 2.  See Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1248–49 (11th Cir. 
2011) (discussing the legislation’s scope); see also TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: PLANNING EFFORTS FOR THE TAX PROVISIONS OF THE PATIENT 
PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT APPEAR ADEQUATE; HOWEVER, THE RESOURCE 
ESTIMATION PROCESS NEEDS IMPROVEMENT, HIGHLIGHTS (2012), 
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2012reports/201243064fr.pdf (noting that the legislation 
“includes the largest set of tax law changes in more than 20 years”). 




  In that same case, the Court struck down, on 
federalism grounds, the parts of the legislation that expanded Medicaid 
coverage.
4
  In 2014, the Court held that, pursuant to the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, the requirement to provide certain 




In the final case of the trilogy, the issue before the Court was 
whether tax credits are available to qualified individuals who purchase 
health insurance on either Federal or State Exchanges or whether such 
credits are limited to qualified individuals who purchase health insurance 
on State Exchanges.
6
  The tax credits subsidize the cost of health 
insurance for lower income individuals and are critical to the 
achievement of near universal health coverage.
7
 Moreover, this subsidy 
is also important in the prevention of the phenomenon of adverse 
selection and the attendant chaos that this phenomenon may create in the 
health insurance market.
8
  This issue took on heightened importance 
because Federal Exchanges serve consumers in a vast majority of states.
9
  
On June 25, 2015, the Court held that the Act makes available tax credits 




The Court’s decision was an interesting exercise in statutory 
construction.  Frankly, the arguments set forth by both the majority and 
dissenting opinions were convincing.  However, the manner in which the 
Court handled the issue of judicial deference to the Internal Revenue 
Service (I.R.S.) regulations in question was troubling.  The Court did not 
defer to the I.R.S. despite the admitted ambiguity of the statute because 
the issue presented was extraordinary and, as such, belied the 
congressional intent to delegate its resolution to the I.R.S.
11
  The Court 
also questioned the expertise of the agency with respect to health care 
                                                          
 3.   Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012).  See infra note 23 
and accompanying text.  
 4.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2607.  See infra note 44 (explaining the part of the 
legislation that expanded Medicaid coverage). 
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  However, the Court’s methodology appears to provide the 
judicial branch with the opportunity to impose its own policy preferences 
with respect to issues best left to Congress. 
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act.  It includes a discussion of the Exchanges, the 
individual and employer mandates, and the tax credit.  Part II provides an 
analysis of the two cases that created a Circuit Court split with respect to 
the issue of tax credit availability and the Supreme Court decision.  Part 
III critiques the Court’s deference jurisprudence and asserts that the 
Court’s reasoning can be taken as an invitation to judicial policy-making.  
This part also includes two examples of recent issues to illustrate how 
ambiguities in extraordinary cases could, conceivably, be resolved by the 
courts despite the fact that Congress did not see fit to delegate the issue 
to another body.  This part also asserts that the Court’s standing 
jurisprudence is fundamentally at odds with its deference jurisprudence 
in the extraordinary cases in which deference to an agency is 
unwarranted. 
I. PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: AN 
OVERVIEW 
A. The Exchanges 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act segments the health 
insurance market into four markets: the individual market, two employer-
provided group insurance markets, the small and large group market, and 
the American Health Benefit Exchanges (Exchanges).
13
  The Exchanges 
are governmental or non-profit entities that, inter alia, establish, and 
monitor compliance with, insurance standards and function as insurance 
marketplaces in which individuals have the ability to comparison-shop 
for insurance products.
14
  Each state must create and operate, as of 
January 1, 2014, an Exchange that offers insurance for purchase by 
individuals and employees of small employers.
15
  Under certain 
                                                          
 12.  See infra notes 119–20 and accompanying text.  
 13.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1304, 1311, 1312, 
124 Stat. 119, 171, 174, 182 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18024, 18031, 18032 (2012)).  The 
federal government provided funding to states to establish the Exchanges until January 1, 2015.  Id. 
§ 1311(d)(5)(A), 124 Stat. at 178 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2012)).  
 14.  Id. § 1311, 124 Stat. at 173 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(1)–(4) (2012)). 
 15.  Id. § 1311(b), 124 Stat. at 173 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2012)).  After 2016, states 
have the option of allowing large employers to participate in the Exchanges.  Id. § 1312(f)(2)(B), 
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circumstances, a state may participate in a multi-state regional Exchange 
or establish subsidiary Exchanges to operate within a state.
16
  A state 
may opt out of creating and operating an Exchange in which case the 
Exchange will be established by the federal government.
17
  These 
Exchanges may be operated exclusively by the Department of Health and 
Human Services or in partnership with the state with authority over the 
operation of the Exchange residing within the Department of Health and 
Human Services.
18





The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act added section 5000A 
to the Internal Revenue Code—the so-called individual mandate.
20
  The 
                                                          
124 Stat. at 184 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18032 (2012)).  Qualified employers may also purchase 
group plans through the Exchanges.  Id. § 1311(d)(2), 124 Stat. at 176 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
18031 (2012)).  Small employers purchasing coverage for their employees through the Exchanges 
may be eligible for a tax credit up to 50 percent of the cost of their contributions toward such 
coverage.  The credit phases out based on the number of individuals employed full-time by the 
employer and the average wages paid by the employer.  No credit is allowed for employers with 25 
or more full-time employees or employers that pay average wages in excess of $50,000, adjusted for 
inflation after 2013.  See I.R.C. § 45R (West 2015).  Small business utilization of the Exchanges has 
been tepid, in part due to minimal insurance options available on the Exchanges and, in part, due to 
the often-meager tax credit available.  See Adam Janofsky, Small Businesses Spurn Health 
Exchange, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2015, at B4.   
 16.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1311(f), 124 Stat. at 179 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 18031 (2012)).  See also 45 C.F.R. § 155.140 (2013).  
 17.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1321(c), 124 Stat. at 186 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 18041 (2012)).  
 18.  See Bernadette Fernandez & Annie L. Mach, Health Insurance Exchanges Under the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), CONG. RES. SERV. 12–13 (Jan. 31, 2013), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42663.pdf.  Seven Exchanges operate under this model; see also 
State Health Insurance Marketplace Types, 2016, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 
http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-health-insurance-marketplace-types/ (last visited 
Jan. 6, 2016).  Four states operate federally supported Exchanges.  Id.  These Exchanges are 
operated by state authorities through the use of federal information technology infrastructure.  Id. 
 19.  See State Health Insurance Exchange: State Run Exchanges, OBAMACARE FACTS, 
http://obamacarefacts.com/state-health-insurance-exchange/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2016).  Residents of 
other states purchase health insurance through a Federal Exchange using the HealthCare.Gov portal.  
During the 2015 open enrollment period, approximately 8.8 million individuals obtained coverage 
on federally-assisted Exchanges.  Robert Pear, 86 Percent of Health Law Enrollees Receive 
Subsidies, White House Says, N.Y. TIMES, March 11, 2015, at A17.  During the original enrollment 
period between October 1, 2013 and March 31, 2014, approximately 5.4 million individuals were 
enrolled on the Federal Exchanges. Amy Burke et al., Premium Affordability, Competition, and 
Choice in the Health Insurance Marketplace, DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (June 18, 2014), 
https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/76896/2014MktPlacePremBrf.pdf.  
 20.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 1501(b), 10106(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 244–49, 
909–10 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 5000A (2012)).  The penalty amount imposed by the statute 
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individual mandate is critical to the mitigation of adverse selection in 
light of the insurance market reforms that were part of the legislation.
21
  
This provision survived a constitutional challenge when the Court, in 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, upheld it under 
Congress’s taxing power despite holding that its enactment exceeded 
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.
22
  The individual 
mandate requires that an applicable individual maintain minimum 
essential coverage for such individual and any dependents that are also 
applicable individuals each month beginning after 2013.
23
  Failure to 
maintain such coverage for one or more months results in the imposition 
of a shared responsibility payment—a penalty that is to be included with 
a taxpayer’s income tax return for the taxable year, which includes the 
month that such failure occurred.
24
  The requirement to maintain 
                                                          
was amended shortly thereafter by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. 
L. No. 111-152, § 1002, 124 Stat. 1029, 1032–33 (2010) (codified at I.R.C. § 5000A (2012)).  
 21.  Adverse selection refers to the propensity of those most in need of insurance to purchase it 
while those individuals with little or no perceived need of insurance—the young and healthy, for 
example—forego its purchase.  Adverse selection reduces the number of no or low claim customers 
needed by the insurers to keep premiums affordable.  Among the insurance market reforms are 
community rating and guarantee issue requirements.  Insurers may not price discriminate on any 
basis except age, family size, smoking, and geographic areas.  Consequently, insurers can neither 
deny coverage to those individuals with pre-existing medical conditions nor price their coverage to 
account for such pre-existing conditions.  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1201, 
124 Stat. at 155 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-1, 300gg-3 (2012)).  For a succinct discussion of 
the changes the Act made to the health insurance market see Sarah Somers & Jane Perkins, The 
Affordable Care Act: A Giant Step Toward Insurance Coverage for All Americans, 44 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 
 330 (2010), 
http://povertylaw.org/system/files/chr_article_pdf/chr_2010_november_december_somers.pdf.  See 
also Jonathan Gruber, The Impacts of the Affordable Care Act: How Reasonable are the 
Projections? 4–7 (Nat’l Bur. of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17168, 2011).  Whether or not 
the legislative scheme works as intended remains to be seen but there is evidence that the adverse 
selection is alive and well in some markets.  See Abby Goodnough, Success of Kentucky’s Health 
Plan Comes With New Obstacles, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2014, at A1. 
 22.  132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593, 2600 (2012). 
 23.  I.R.C. § 5000A(a).  The term “applicable individual” excludes individuals who qualify for 
statutorily defined religious conscience or health ministry exemptions, who are not citizens or 
nationals of the United States or legal aliens present in the United States, or who are incarcerated.  
Id. § 5000A(d).  Individuals whose required contribution exceeds eight percent of household income, 
individuals with very low income, and members of Indian tribes are not subject to the penalty.  Id. § 
5000A(e)(1)–(3).  
 24.  Id. § 5000A(b)(1)–(2).  Recent government estimates anticipate that approximately six 
million households may be subject to the individual mandate for 2014.  See Stephanie Armour,  
Millions Face a Health-Insurance Penalty, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2015, at A3.  No penalty is 
imposed for gaps in coverage of less than three months.  I.R.C. § 5000A(e)(4).  The penalty is 
assessed and collected in the same manner as other assessable penalties but neither criminal penalties 
may be imposed nor criminal prosecution undertaken for failure to pay the penalty.  Moreover, liens 
and levies to collect unpaid penalties are prohibited.  Id. § 5000A(g).   
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minimum essential coverage is variously met through, among other 
means, Medicare or Medicaid coverage, individual insurance policies, or 
eligible employer-sponsored group health plans or insurance coverage.
25
 
An applicable individual is an individual other than an individual 
who qualifies for statutorily defined religious conscience or health 
ministry exemptions, who is not a citizen or national of the United States 
or a legal alien present in the United States, or who is incarcerated.
26
  No 
penalty is imposed on individuals whose required contribution exceeds 
eight percent of household income.
27
  The required contribution for 
individuals who are eligible only to purchase insurance in the individual 
market is the annual premium for the lowest bronze plan available in the 
market in which the individual resides reduced by the amount of any 
credit available under section 36B.
28
  The tax credit, discussed 
subsequently, reduces the amount of a taxpayer’s required contribution 
and thus potentially reducing the number of taxpayers who would be 
entitled to this exemption.
29
  Finally, individuals with very low incomes, 
members of Indian tribes, and bona-fide residents of any possession of 
the United States are not subject to the penalty.
30
 
The amount of the penalty due for a taxable year is the lesser of the 
sum of the monthly penalty amounts or the amount of the national 
average insurance premiums for a particular level of coverage for the 
applicable family size involved that is offered through insurance 
Exchanges.
31
  The monthly penalty amount is one-twelfth of the greater 
                                                          
 25.  Id. § 5000A(f).  Policies whose medical coverage is secondary to the primary purpose of 
the policy, such as auto insurance policies, credit insurance policies, and workers’ compensation 
coverage are not deemed to provide minimum essential coverage.  Also, minimum essential 
coverage is not provided by policies whose coverage is limited to medical treatment received at on-
site medical clinics or for specific illnesses or diseases.  See id. § 5000A(f)(3); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
91(c) (2012).  
 26.  I.R.C. § 5000A(d) (2012). 
 27.  Id. § 5000A(e)(1)(A). 
 28.  Id. § 5000A(e)(1)(B)(ii).  Bronze level coverage is designed to provide benefits that are 
actuarially equivalent to 60 percent of the full actuarial value of statutorily enumerated benefits.  42 
U.S.C. §§ 18022(b),(d) (2012).  Silver, gold, and platinum coverage levels provide benefits that are 
actuarially equivalent to 70, 80, and 90 percent of the full actuarial value of statutorily enumerated 
benefits, respectively.  Id. § 18022(d).  See infra notes 42–53 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of the tax credit allowable under I.R.C. § 36B.  The required contribution for an individual eligible 
for coverage under an eligible-employer sponsored plan is the annual premium that would be paid by 
the individual for self-coverage.  Id. § 5000A(e)(1)(B)(i). 
 29.  See infra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. 
 30.  I.R.C. §§ 5000A(e)(2)–(3), (f)(4)(B).  Bona-fide residents of possessions of the United 
States are deemed to have minimum essential coverage and, therefore, are not subject to the penalty.  
See id. § 5000A(f)(4)(B). 
 31.  Id. § 5000A(c)(1).  The national average premium is determined for plans that provide a 
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of a flat dollar amount or a percentage of income.
32
 
A significant portion of health insurance is delivered to individuals 
through their employers.  This system, aided and abetted by income tax 
subsidies, had its genesis as a mechanism to avoid wage controls during 
World War II.
33
  The addition of section 4980H to the Internal Revenue 
Code by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was made to 
prevent employers, given the tax credits and subsidies discussed 
subsequently, from dropping health insurance coverage for their 
employees and dumping their employees on the Exchanges.
34
  This 
                                                          
bronze level of coverage.  See supra note 28.  The monthly national average bronze plan premium 
for 2015 is $207 per individual and $1,035 for a family with five or more members.  Rev. Proc. 
2015-15, 2015-5 I.R.B. 564.  The use of the national average premium rather than state average 
premiums avoids the possibility that the shared responsibility payment violates the uniformity 
requirement for taxes that are not direct taxes.  Congress’s power to tax is expansive, but it is not 
unlimited.  In addition to the constitutional limitations applicable to the exercise of any federal 
power, there are structural limitations specific to the taxing power.  Certain taxes must be uniform.  
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.1.  The precise contours of the uniformity requirement was subject to some 
debate during the first century of the republic but it now refers simply to geographic uniformity—
federal tax rates must be the same throughout the United States.  Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 
83–106 (1900).  The uniformity requirement rarely surfaces as a point of contention, perhaps due to 
the political difficulties that would be encountered in enacting a provision that overtly disfavored a 
particular geographic region, but on occasion the issue does arise.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 86 (1983) (stating that an exemption from an oil profits tax for certain 
Alaskan oil did not provide Alaska with an undue preference over other states).   
 32.  I.R.C. § 5000A(c)(2).  The flat dollar amount was $95 per individual failure in 2014, 
increased to $325 per individual failure in 2015, and then settles at $695 per individual failure 
thereafter subject to annual cost of living increases beginning in 2017.  Id. §§ 5000A(c)(2)(A), 
(c)(3)(A)–(B), (D).  The total flat dollar amount penalty cannot exceed 300 percent of the individual 
amounts.  Id. § 5000A(c)(2)(A)(ii).  The tax base for the percentage of income penalty amount is the 
taxpayer’s household income in excess of the amount of gross income that is necessary to impose a 
duty on the taxpayer to file an income tax return.  Id. §§ 5000A(c)(2)(B), 6012(a)(1).  The penalty 
was equal to one percent of the tax base in 2014, is two percent of the tax base in 2015, and will be 
two and one-half percent of the tax base thereafter.  Id. § 5000A(c)(2)(B).   
 33.  See Thomas C. Buchmueller & Alan C. Monheit, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance 
and the Promise of Health Insurance Reform 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
14389, 2009).  Although group purchases of insurance yield certain efficiencies, the system has been 
subject to much criticism by economists because, among other things, it provides greater subsidies to 
higher income individuals, masks the true cost of coverage to the insured resulting in the 
overconsumption of medical care, and distorts labor market mobility due to lack of portability.  See 
id. at 8–14.  The tax subsidy that results from tax-exempt income is dependent upon the marginal tax 
rates of the taxpayer who receives such income.  The portability issue has been addressed in part by 
the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 
Stat. 82 (1986).  Provisions of this statute mandate that employers with 20 or more full-time 
equivalent employees offer medical coverage for a period of 18 months to an employee or covered 
family member after a qualifying event.  See generally I.R.C. § 4980B.  Among qualifying events 
are voluntary or involuntary termination of employment, divorce, death, and disability.  Id.  For 
certain qualifying events, the coverage period is 29 months or 36 months.  Id.  The employee must 
pay for the cost of coverage plus an allowable administrative fee.  Id.  Failure to provide COBRA 
coverage subjects an employer to an excise tax. Id.   
 34.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1513, 10106(e), 124 
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provision imposes an exaction on certain employers if they either do not 
offer insurance coverage to their employees or offer coverage that is 
deemed inadequate under the statute.
35
  An assessable payment is 
imposed on employers with an average of fifty or more full-time or full-
time equivalent employees during the preceding calendar year if such 
employers fail to offer affordable minimum essential health care 
coverage to their full-time employees and one or more such employees 
qualify for the tax credit or premium subsidies.
36
 
The Obama administration has twice delayed the enforcement of 
these provisions.  In 2013, the I.R.S. issued a notice that enforcement of 
these provisions would be delayed until 2015.
37
  In 2014, final 
regulations were issued that further delayed enforcement until 2016 for 
employers with less than 100 full-time equivalent employees or for those 
                                                          
Stat. 119, 253–56, 910–11 (2010) (codified as amended in I.R.C. § 4980H (2012)).  See infra notes 
42–53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the tax credits and premium subsidies.  
 35.  I.R.C. § 4980H.  A federal district court upheld the constitutionality, on Commerce Clause 
grounds, of both the individual and employer mandates, but its decision was vacated by the Fourth 
Circuit due to the application of the Anti-Injunction Act.  See Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. 
Supp. 2d 611, 635–36 (W.D. Va. 2010), vacated, Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 403 
(4th Cir. 2011), vacated, Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 133 S. Ct. 679 (2012), aff’d sub nom., 
Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Lew, 733 F.3d 72 (4th Cir. 2013).  The Anti-Injunction Act prohibits, subject 
to few exceptions, any “suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax . . . 
in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was 
assessed.”  I.R.C. § 7421(a).  However, in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 
the Court held that despite the status of the individual mandate penalty as a tax for constitutional 
purposes, the penalty was not a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act.  See 132 S. Ct. 2566, 
2594 (2012).  In light of its holding in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the 
Court granted certiorari and remanded the case back to the Fourth Circuit.  Liberty Univ. v. 
Geithner, 133 S. Ct. 679, 679 (2012).  The Fourth Circuit then held that Liberty University had 
standing to challenge the employer mandate and upheld the constitutionality of the employer 
mandate.  See Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Lew, 733 F.3d 72, 105 (4th Cir. 2013).  Both mandates were 
also challenged in another case.  However, the court dismissed the complaint for lack for standing.  
See N.J. Physicians, Inc. v. Obama, 757 F. Supp. 2d 502, 511 (D.N.J. 2010), aff’d sub nom., N.J. 
Physicians, Inc. v. President of the United States, 653 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 36.  I.R.C. §§ 4980H(a), (c)(2)(A).  For this purpose, minimum essential coverage has the same 
meaning as it has for purposes of the individual mandate imposed by I.R.C. § 5000A(f).  Treas. Reg. 
§ 54.4980H-1(a)(27) (2014).  A full-time employee is defined as an employee who is employed an 
average of at least 30 hours per week.  I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(4)(A).  Full-time equivalent employees are 
a combination of employees, none of whom are full-time employees, who are counted as full-time 
employees for purposes of determining whether an employer is an applicable large employer.  Treas. 
Reg. § 54.4980H-1(a)(22) (2014).  The full-time equivalency rules apply only for the purposes of 
determining whether an employer employs an average of 50 or more full-time employees and not for 
the purpose of determining the penalty amount.  I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(E).  Failure to offer such 
coverage results in the imposition of a penalty for each full-time employee in excess of 30 up to 
$2,000 per annum if no coverage is provided and one employee qualifies for a premium tax credit or 
cost sharing subsidy.  See id. §§ 4980H(a), 4980H(c)(1), (2)(D)(i)(I).  The maximum annual penalty 
amount is $3,000 if unaffordable coverage is offered.  See I.R.C. § 4980H(b)(1).  
 37.  I.R.S. Notice 2013-45, 2013-31 I.R.B. 116.  
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employers with 100 or more full-time equivalent employees that provide 
affordable health insurance coverage to at least 70 percent of 
employees.
38
  The delays have generated controversy because the statute 
does not authorize such delays.
39
 
In addition, an excise tax is imposed in the amount of $100 per day 
for each affected individual if the group health plan does not conform to 
the requirements of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
40
  
The application of both section 4980H and the excise tax were at issue in 
the Court’s recent holding that closely-held corporations are protected by 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
41
 
                                                          
 38.  Shared Responsibility for Employers Regarding Health Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. 8544, 
8574–75 (Feb. 12, 2014) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 54, & 301).  Moreover, employers with 
100 or more full-time equivalent employees will not be subject to the full mandate in 2016 if they 
provide coverage to at least 95 percent of employees.  Treas. Reg. § 54.4980H-4 (2014).  The final 
rules prohibit the application of these transition rules if the employer reduces the size of its 
workforce or the overall hours of service of its employees between February 9, 2014, and December 
31, 2014, in order to qualify for relief under the less than 100 full-time equivalent employee test.  
Shared Responsibility for Employers Regarding Health Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. at 8574.  Workforce 
or hour reductions are permitted for bona fide business reasons.  Id.  Moreover, transition relief is 
denied to employers that would otherwise qualify if such employer eliminates or materially reduces 
health coverage it offered as of February 9, 2014.  Id.  Employers subject to the mandate for plan 
years beginning in 2015 will be subject to an assessable payment only for full-time employees in 
excess of 80 instead of full-time employees in excess of 30 as previously noted.  Id. at 8575. 
 39.  The House of Representatives has filed a lawsuit over the administration’s actions.  See 
Complaint, U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, No. 14-1967, 2015 WL 5294762 (D.D.C. 
Sept. 9, 2015); see also Michael R. Crittenden & Colleen McCain Nelson, House Authorizes 
Boehner to Sue President, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2014, at A4; Jeremy W. Peters, Partisanship Infuses 
Hearings on Health Law and Executive Power, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2014, at A15.  The district 
court held that the House of Representatives has standing to bring an action over the Obama 
Administration’s spending of unappropriated funds to implement portions of the legislation but 
lacked the standing to challenge the delays in implementing the statute.  See Burwell, 2015 WL 
5294762 at *3–4; see also infra notes 266–82 and accompanying text. 
 40.  See I.R.C. §§ 4980D(a)–(b), 9815 (2012).  The excise tax imposed by I.R.C. § 4980D pre-
dates the enactment of Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.  The excise tax is triggered by 
the failure of a plan to conform to the requirements of chapter 100 of the Internal Revenue Code.  Id. 
§ 4980D(a).  I.R.C. § 9815 was added to chapter 100 by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act to incorporate its changes into chapter 100.  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1563(f), 124 Stat. 119, 270 (2010) (as redesignated by § 10107(b)(1), 124 
Stat. at 911).  Plans cannot exclude coverage of preexisting conditions, must not, in general, impose 
lifetime or annual limits on the dollar amount of benefits, must offer coverage to dependent children 
under the age of 26, and provide coverage of preventive services.  See generally Temp. Treas. Reg. 
§§ 54.9815-2704T, 2711T, 54.9815-2714T (2010); Treas. Reg. § 54.9815-2713 (2015).  The I.R.S. 
has provided certain small employers transition relief from the excise tax until June 30, 2015.  See 
I.R.S. Notice 2015-17, 2015-14 I.R.B. 845. 
 41.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762, 2769 (2014).  One objective 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is the provision of preventative care for women.  
See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012).  Recommended guidelines were published on August 1, 
2011 that included, as part of such preventive care, FDA-approved contraceptive methods for 
women, with discretionary exemptions for churches, their auxiliaries, and religious orders.  See 
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C. The Tax Credit 
Federal tax credits are provided to individuals and families whose 
income is below a certain threshold and who pay premiums for insurance 
through an Exchange established by the State under section 1311 of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
42
  An individual who is 
                                                          
Women’s Preventative Services Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. HEALTH RES. 
AND SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2016); 45 C.F.R. 
§ 147.131(a) (2013) (presenting exemption and accommodations in connection with coverage of 
preventative health services); see also Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to 
Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 
46,621, 46,623 (Aug. 3, 2011).  After originally providing certain religious non-profit employers 
with an additional year to comply with the contraception coverage, the Obama Administration, under 
pressure from various religious groups, announced a compromise whereby insurance companies 
would provide contraception coverage for employees of certain religious non-profit employers—
termed “eligible organizations”—free of charge if the employers decided not to provide such 
coverage.  See 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b)–(c) (2015); see also Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, 
The White House, Fact Sheet: Women’s Preventive Servs. and Religious Institutions (Feb. 10, 
2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/10/fact-sheet-women-s-preventive-
services-and-religious-institutions.  This accommodation has itself come under attack.  See Wheaton 
Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807 (2014) (granting preliminary injunction).  As a result, the 
Obama Administration modified the accommodation.  See Treas. Reg. § 54.9815-2713AT (2014) 
(removed by 80 Fed. Reg. 41,318, 41,344 (2015)).  No other exemptions or concessions were made 
for any other persons who object, on religious grounds, to the coverage of contraceptive services.  
The Court, in a 5-4 ruling, held that three for-profit corporations are persons for purposes of the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, that the contraception mandate imposed a substantial burden on 
their free exercise rights, and that the government could have achieved its asserted compelling 
purpose by less-restrictive means.  See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2769, 2779, 2781–82.  
The I.R.S. recently issued regulations that would extend accommodations to certain closely-held for-
profit entities whose highest governing body adopts a resolution that sets forth the entity’s objection 
to the provision of some or all forms of contraception due to the owners’ sincerely held religious 
beliefs.  See Treas. Reg. § 54.9815-2713A (2015).  Challenges to the accommodation have thus far 
proven unsuccessful.  See, e.g., Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 
1151 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 446 (2015); Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 
F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2015); Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229 
(D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 446 (2015).  
 42.  See I.R.C. § 36B(a), (b), (c)(1)(A).  Advance payments of the credits may be made in the 
form of reductions to the monthly insurance premiums and such advance payments reduce the 
amount of the credit under section 36B.  Id. § 36B(f)(1).  In the event that advances exceed the credit 
amount to which the taxpayer is entitled, the excess amount advanced increases the income tax owed 
by the taxpayer, subject to certain limitations based on the level of the taxpayer’s household income.  
Id. § 36B(f)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-4 (2012).  Advance credits may yield unpleasant surprises for 
many taxpayers.  An estimate by H&R Block Inc. predicts that approximately 3.4 million taxpayers 
may have received excess advance credits.  See Stephanie Armour & Louise Radnofsky, Health Law 
is Creating a Trickier Tax Season, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2015, at A1.  The I.R.S. estimates that 4.5 
million taxpayers must file returns to reconcile the tax credits they received and that approximately 
710,000 of these taxpayers have neither filed a return nor requested an extension.  Letter from John 
A. Koskinen, Comm’r, I.R.S., to Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Comm. on Finance, U.S. Senate 
(July 17, 2015), http://hr.cch.com/hrw/Koskinen071715LettertoCongress.pdf.  The I.R.S. has agreed 
to waive, for 2014, the penalties imposed by I.R.C. sections 6651(a)(2) and 6654(a) for failure to pay 
tax and failure to make required estimated tax payments, respectively, that are attributable to excess 
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covered under any eligible employer-sponsored plan or who is offered 
health insurance coverage through an eligible employer-sponsored plan 
under which the employee’s required contribution with respect to the 
plan does not exceed 9.5 percent of the applicable taxpayer’s income and 




The credit is designed to subsidize health insurance coverage for 
taxpayers whose income does not exceed 400 percent of the poverty line 
for a family of the size involved.
44
  The credit is determined on a 
monthly basis and is the lesser of: 
(A) the monthly premiums for such month for 1 or more qualified 
health plans offered in the individual market within a State which cover 
the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse, or any dependent . . . and which 
were enrolled in through an Exchange established by the State . . . or 
(B) the excess (if any) of the adjusted monthly premium for such month 
                                                          
advance credits for taxpayers who are otherwise current in their tax liabilities and who properly 
report the excess credits on their tax returns.  See I.R.S. Notice 2015-9, 2015-6 I.R.B. 590.  The 
federal government has experienced difficulty in properly reporting the credits to which taxpayers 
are entitled in 2014.  See What Consumers Need to Know About Corrected Form 1095-As, THE CMS 
BLOG (Feb. 20, 2015), http://blog.cms.gov/2015/02/20/what-consumers-need-to-know-about-
corrected-form-1095-as/.  As a result, the I.R.S. will not impose penalties on taxpayers who received 
erroneous credit information or collect additional taxes from taxpayers who filed returns using 
erroneous credit information.  See Questions and Answers - Incorrect Forms 1095-A and the 
Premium Tax Credit, I.R.S. (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.irs.gov/Affordable-Care-Act/Individuals-
and-Families/Questions-and-Answers-Incorrect-Forms-1095A-and-the-Premium-Tax-Credit; see 
also Stephanie Armour, Taxpayers Set to Get a Health Break, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2015, at A3.  
 43.  See I.R.C. § 36B(c)(2).  A taxpayer also is ineligible for the credit if she is offered 
minimum essential coverage other than such coverage through the individual market.  See id. § 
36B(c)(2)(B).  
 44.  See id. § 36B(c)(1)(A).  Except for aliens lawfully present in the United States and 
ineligible for Medicaid benefits, taxpayers whose incomes are below 100 percent of the federal 
poverty line do not qualify for credits or cost sharing reductions.  See id. § 36B(c)(1)(B).  Generally, 
such taxpayers would qualify for Medicaid benefits.  However, the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act’s expansion of Medicaid was held unconstitutional because it was considered 
impermissibly coercive to the states.  See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 
2606–07 (2012).  Consequently, states could opt to decline to expand Medicaid eligibility without 
the loss of federal funds provided under existing programs.  See id. at 2607.  As a result, it is 
possible that some taxpayers will be ineligible for the tax credits and cost sharing reductions and not 
be eligible for Medicaid benefits if they reside in a state that chose not to expand Medicaid coverage.  
Twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia have chosen to expand Medicaid eligibility, and 
Alaska and Montana appear likely to do so.  Louise Radnofsky, Alaska Governor Moves to Expand 
Medicaid, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2015, at A3.  Indiana recently expanded its Medicaid program under 
an agreement with the federal government that would permit the state to require Medicaid enrollees 
to contribute toward the cost of medical insurance coverage.  Louise Radnofsky & Arian Campo-
Flores, Deal Offers Model for Medicaid Expansion, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2015, at A1.  Individuals 
covered under a state Medicaid program may find access to medical services more difficult because 
of drastic cuts in Medicaid reimbursement rates.  See Robert Pear, As Medicaid Rolls Swell, Cuts in 
Payments to Doctors Threaten Access to Care, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2014, at A20.  
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for the applicable second lowest cost silver plan with respect to the 
taxpayer, over . . . 1/12 of . . . [a percentage of the] taxpayer’s 
household income for the taxable year.
45
   
 
In effect, the credit subsidy is limited to the excess of the premium 
cost of a baseline plan over a percentage, which increases as the 
taxpayer’s household income approaches 400 percent of the poverty line, 
of the taxpayer’s household income.
46
 
The allowance of a tax credit can trigger the applicability of the 
individual mandate with respect to the individual entitled to the credit.
47
  
The allowable credit reduces such an individual’s required contribution 
for purposes of determining whether insurance coverage is affordable by 
such individual and, therefore, mandated.
48
  In addition, the penalty 
imposed on employers by section 4980H is triggered by the attainment of 
a credit or cost sharing reduction by one employee.
49
  Section 36B’s 
language appears to limit eligibility for a tax credit to taxpayers who are 
enrolled in State Exchanges.
50
  However, regulations were issued 
pursuant to those participants in Federal Exchanges who would also 
qualify for the credit.
51
  Sylvia Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, stated that approximately 87 percent of Federal Exchange 
                                                          
 45.  I.R.C. § 36B(b)(2).  In the event that a qualified health plan offers benefits in addition to 
the essential health benefits required to be provided by the plan or a state requires that such 
additional benefits be provided under the plan, the portion of the premium properly allocable to such 
additional benefits are not taken into account.  Id. § 36B(b)(3)(D); see supra note 28 (explaining 
silver plans).  
 46.  The applicable percentage varies from a minimum of 2 percent to a maximum of 9.5 
percent, subject to adjustment after 2014 to account for the possibility that health insurance costs 
increase faster than the rate of income growth.  I.R.C. § 36B(b)(3)(A).  Additional adjustments are to 
be made beginning in 2019 if premium cost increases exceed the growth in the consumer price index 
and the subsidies exceed a certain level of gross domestic product.  Id. § 36B(b)(3)(A)(ii).  
Household income is the sum of the modified adjusted gross income of all individuals who were 
taken into account in determining the taxpayer’s family size and were required to file a tax return for 
the taxable year.  Id. § 36B(d)(2)(A).  Modified adjusted gross income is adjusted gross income plus 
foreign income excluded under I.R.C. section 911, tax-exempt interest, and non-taxable social 
security benefits.  Id. § 36B(d)(2)(B).  The federal poverty line is the most recently published 
poverty guidelines as of the first day of the regular enrollment period for coverage through an 
Exchange for the calendar year.  Id. § 36B(d)(3).  
 47.  See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 48.  See I.R.C. § 5000A(e)(1)(B)(ii). 
 49.  See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 50.  See supra note 42 and accompanying text.  
 51.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-1(k) (2012) (defining Exchange by reference to 45 C.F.R. 155.20 
(2012)), id. § 1.36B-2(a) (providing eligibility for credit by enrollment in an Exchange); 45 C.F.R. § 
155.20 (2012) (stating that the term Exchange refers to State Exchanges, regional Exchanges, 
subsidiary Exchanges, and a Federally-facilitated Exchange). 
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enrollees qualified for tax credits.
52
  According to the Congressional 
Budget Office, the average tax credit for 2014 was $4,330.
53
 
II. COURT DECISIONS 
A. Circuit Court Split 
Several Virginia residents challenged the validity of the regulations 
that entitled qualified enrollees on Federal Exchanges to tax credits.
54
  
Virginia did not establish an Exchange, and the Federal Exchange, 
HealthCare.gov, serves its residents.
55
  The availability of credits 
pursuant to the regulations caused these Virginia residents to be subject 
to the individual mandate because the allowable credits rendered their 
insurance costs affordable under the statute.
56
  The Fourth Circuit 
unanimously affirmed the district court’s holding that the statute as a 
whole evinced Congress’s intent to make the credits available nationwide 
and, consequently, the regulations were within the Treasury’s authority.
57
 
The court applied the two-step framework set forth in Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc.
58
  First, the court 
held that the statutory language did not clearly and unambiguously reveal 
the intent of Congress with respect to the availability of tax credits for 
individuals enrolled on Federal Exchanges.
59
  Although the language of 
section 36B clearly referred only to Exchanges established by a state, the 
court refused to “‘confine itself to examining a particular statutory 
provision in isolation.’”
60
  The court believed that section 1311, the 
                                                          
 52.  Press Release, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 87 Percent of People Who Selected 2015 
Plans Through HealthCare.gov in First Month of Open Enrollment Are Getting Financial Assistance 
to Lower Monthly Premiums (Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2014/12/30/87-
percent-people-who-selected-2015-plans-through-healthcaregov-first-month-open-enrollment-
are.html.  Approximately 86 percent of all enrollees, whether enrolled on State or Federal 
Exchanges, receive subsidies.  Pear, supra note 19, at A17.  
 53.  Louise Radnofsky, Republicans to Block Legislative Fix to Health-Care Law, WALL ST. J. 
(Jan. 29, 2015, 6:53 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/republicans-to-block-legislative-fix-to-health-
care-law-1422575627. 
 54.  See King v. Sebelius, 997 F. Supp. 2d 415, 427 (E.D. Va. 2014), aff’d sub nom. King v. 
Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 55.  Id. at 419. 
 56.  Id. at 420–21.  See also supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.  
 57.  King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 363, 369 (4th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).  
 58.  Id. at 367.  See infra note 69 for a discussion of the application of the Chevron framework 
to tax regulations.  
 59.  King, 759 F.3d at 369.  
 60.  Id. at 368 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 666 
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provision authorizing State Exchanges, section 1321, the provision 
authorizing Federal Exchanges, and a definitional provision of the Act 
could plausibly be read to treat Federal Exchanges as Exchanges 
established by a state.
61
  In effect, all Exchanges are State Exchanges.
62
 
The court also found that two other statutory provisions were 
irreconcilable with the appellants’ assertion that section 36B denies the 
availability of credits to taxpayers enrolled on Federal Exchanges.  First, 
the information reporting requirements of section 36B apply to all 
Exchanges and these requirements mandate the reporting of credit 
information.
63
  The court believed that the imposition of such a reporting 
requirement on Federal Exchanges belied the notion that credits are 
unavailable to taxpayers enrolled through such Exchanges.
64
  Secondly, 
only “qualified individuals” are eligible to purchase insurance from the 
Exchanges and, because such term is defined as a person who resides in 
the state that established the Exchange, the appellants’ interpretation of 
the statute would leave a Federal Exchange with no eligible customers.
65
 
The court found little guidance in the legislative history of the 
statute.  Several floor statements by Senators indicated that all taxpayers 
would have access to the credits.
66
  However, such statements could have 
been made under the assumption that all states would establish 
Exchanges and that denying credits to taxpayers that enrolled through 




                                                          
(2007)).  
 61.  Id. at 369. 
 62.  Id.  
 63.  Id. at 369–70.  
 64.  Id. at 370. 
 65.  Id. at 370–71. 
 66.  Id. at 371. 
 67.  Id. at 371–72.  There is evidence that the Obama Administration assumed that states would 
create Exchanges.  
So this really starts at the States.  States put together exchanges either as a single State or 
in a multi-State area, if that is what they choose.  We provide technical assistance to the 
States to do that.  And even though the timetable for exchanges doesn’t begin until 2014, 
we intend, starting next year, to begin very robust discussions so that we don’t wait until 
the last minute and have States in a situation where they can’t do this.   
 
We have already had lots of positive discussions, and States are very eager to do this.  
And I think it will very much be a State-based program.  And particularly, Congressman, 
it is not to dismantle what is in place right now.  It is really to replace the market for self-
employed Americans, many of whom cannot find affordable coverage, don’t have any 
leverage, a lot of small-business owners who find themselves in the same situation.  
Departments of Labor, Health & Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations 
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Having found that Congress did not speak directly to the precise 
issue raised by the appellants, the court proceeded to the second prong of 
Chevron’s framework—a determination of whether the regulations were 
based on a permissible construction of the statute.
68
  Under Chevron, a 
court will not disturb an agency’s interpretative authority so long as the 
interpretation is not “‘arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 
statute.’”
69
  Under this highly deferential standard, a regulation that is 
reasonably accommodative of conflicting policies committed to an 
agency’s care by the statute will be upheld.
70
  Ambiguities in a statute 
may be resolved through consideration of policy arguments rationally 
related to the statute’s goals.
71
  In this case, the objectives of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act are to increase the number of 
Americans covered by health insurance and to decrease the cost of health 
care.
72
  According to the court, the broad availability of tax credits to 
                                                          
for 2011: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the H.R. Comm. on Appropriations, 111th Cong. 171 
(2010) (statement of Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.) (emphasis added), 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg58233/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg58233.pdf. 
 68.  King, 759 F.3d at 372. 
 69.  Id. (quoting Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Vilsack, 736 F.3d 284, 290 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984))).  The appellants 
asserted that the Exchanges are administered by the Department of Health and Human Services and, 
therefore, the I.R.S. did not have the authority to issue the regulations in question.  Id. at 375.  The 
court rejected this assertion because I.R.C. § 36B delegated to the I.R.S. the authority to resolve 
ambiguities in the statute.  Id.  The appellants further asserted that Chevron deference does not apply 
because tax credits and exemptions are to be construed narrowly.  Id.  According to the court, 
Chevron deference is not displaced in tax matters and in fact, this was reaffirmed by the Supreme 
Court in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United States.  Id. at 375–76.  Prior 
to Chevron, the Court applied a less deferential, multi-factor test to determine whether agency 
regulations were a permissible interpretation of a statute.  Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United 
States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979).  Under this test—the so-called National Muffler test, the courts 
examined whether the regulations in question were a contemporaneous construction of the statute 
promulgated with the awareness of congressional intent; the length of time that the regulations were 
in effect; the degree of reliance placed on the regulations by affected parties; the consistency of the 
agency’s position; and the degree of scrutiny given the regulations by Congress during subsequent 
re-enactments of the statute.  Id.  After Chevron, the Court continued to apply the National Muffler 
test to Treasury regulations issued under the general statutory grant of authority under I.R.C. § 7805 
and limited Chevron deference to Treasury regulations issued under a specific statutory grant of 
authority.  See, e.g., United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24–25 (1982); Rowan Cos. v. 
United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981).  However, the Court did away with the distinction between 
these two types of Treasury regulations in Mayo and held that the Chevron standard applied to all 
Treasury regulations because it acknowledged that the administrative landscape had changed over 
the years and that no special rules were warranted for tax regulations.  See Mayo Found. for Med. 
Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55–57 (2011).  Accordingly, like any other agency 
regulations, tax regulations, regardless of their source of authority, are entitled to Chevron deference.  
See id.  
 70.  King, 759 F.3d at 372–73. 
 71.  Id. at 373. 
 72.  See id. at 373–74. 
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In Halbig v. Burwell, the D.C. Circuit had before it a similar 
challenge to the I.R.S. regulations brought by individual appellants who 
resided in states that did not establish Exchanges.
74
  In a 2-1 decision, the 
D.C. Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment upholding the validity 
of the regulations.
75
  Unlike the Fourth Circuit, the court found no need 
to proceed to the second prong of the Chevron framework because it 
believed that Congress did speak directly to the precise question at 
issue.
76
  According to the D.C. Circuit, Federal Exchanges are equivalent 
to State Exchanges in certain respects, but they differ from State 
Exchanges in one crucial respect.
77
  They are not established by a state as 
required by the language of section 36B.
78
  Section 1321 of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, the provision that authorizes Federal 
Exchanges, omits any language that suggests that such Exchanges should 
be treated as State Exchanges.
79
  Moreover, the D.C. Circuit noted 
Congress was capable of establishing equivalency between Exchanges as 
evidenced by the statutory language creating such equivalency with 
respect to Exchanges established in possessions of the United States.
80
  
Congress’s use of dissimilar language in different parts of a statute is 
presumed intentional.
81
  The D.C. Circuit also rejected the government’s 
contention that all Exchanges are, by definition, established by a state.
82
 
The D.C. Circuit then proceeded to examine whether the so-called 
absurdity doctrine was applicable.
83
  This doctrine avoids statutory 
constructions that would render a statute nonsensical, superfluous, or 
would result in an outcome so contrary to perceived social values that 
                                                          
 73.  Id. at 374–75. 
 74.  758 F.3d 390, 393 (D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’g Halbig v. Sebelius, 27 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 
2014).  The decision of the court was vacated and a rehearing en banc was granted.  Halbig v. 
Burwell, No. 14-5018, 2014 WL 4627181 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 2014).  However, the case 
subsequently was held in abeyance pending the decision of the Supreme Court.  Halbig v. Burwell, 
No. 14-5018, 2014 WL 7520425 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 12, 2014).   
 75.  See Halbig, 758 F.3d at 394, 412.  
 76.  See id. at 398–99. 
 77.  Id. at 400. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  See id.  See also supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text. 
 80.  See Halbig, 758 F.3d at 400. 
 81.  See id. (citing Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2583 (2012)).  
 82.  Id. at 400–02. 
 83.  Id. at 402, 405. 
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such an interpretation belies congressional intent.
84
  In deference to 
separation of powers principles, however, this doctrine is narrowly 
applied, requiring a “‘high threshold’ of unreasonableness before we 
conclude that a statute does not mean what it says.”
85
 
In contrast to the Fourth Circuit, the D.C. Circuit did not consider the 
reporting obligations imposed by section 36B on all Exchanges as 
evidence that Congress intended that tax credits be available to enrollees 
on Federal Exchanges.
86
  The reporting obligations go well beyond tax 
credit information and the fact the tax credits are unavailable for 
individuals enrolled on Federal Exchanges does not render these 
obligations nonsensical in the context of such Exchanges.  The reporting 
obligations merely render the statute over-inclusive—a problem that 
exists in section 36B whether or not tax credits were available to 
enrollees on all Exchanges.
87
  The D.C. Circuit also rejected the 
government’s assertion that its construction of the statute would leave 
Federal Exchanges without any eligible customers.
88
  According to the 
D.C. Circuit, such Exchanges could have customers.
89
  These customers 
would not be “qualified individuals” but they would be customers 
nonetheless.
90
  Finally, the D.C. Circuit rejected the government’s 
contention that its construction of the statute would impose a perpetual 
obligation on states that declined to establish Exchanges to refrain from 
tightening their Medicaid eligibility rules.
91
  Such an obligation is 
imposed on a state until it has established a fully operational Exchange.
92
  
However, the reservation of Medicaid benefits for residents of a state for 
which no tax subsidy is available appeared logical to the D.C. Circuit.
93
 
Despite the fact that the court believed that the statutory language 
was unambiguous, it did proceed to examine the legislative history of the 
statute in an attempt to glean some kernel of congressional intent—a task 
it did not concede was necessary in this case.
94
  The best evidence of 
                                                          
 84.  Id. at 402.  
 85.  Id.  
 86.  Id. at 403–04.  See supra text accompanying notes 63–64.  
 87.  Halbig, 758 F.3d at 404.  
 88.  Id. at 404–05.  The Fourth Circuit came to the opposite conclusion.  See supra text 
accompanying note 65. 
 89.  Halbig, 758 F.3d at 405. 
 90.  Id.  
 91.  Id. at 405–06. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. at 406.  
 94.  Id. at 406–07.  
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congressional intent is the legislation that Congress enacted.
95
  
Legislative history, which has a secondary role in discerning such intent, 
is to be enlisted only when the “‘literal application of a statute will . . . 
produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its 
drafters.’”
96
  Quoting from its own precedent, the D.C. Circuit stated that 
it should depart from the plain meaning of statutory language only upon 
a “most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions.”
97
 
In the D.C. Circuit’s opinion, the legislative history failed to provide 
demonstrable evidence that Congress intended to provide tax credits to 
eligible enrollees on all Exchanges.
98
  The D.C. Circuit found the 
legislative history inconclusive in this respect and believed that a 
reasonable inference could be drawn that the limitation of credits to 
enrollees on State Exchanges was a means to incentivize states to 
establish their own Exchanges.
99
  The D.C. Circuit, moreover, refused to 
countenance the absence of any suggestion in the legislative history that 
credits be so limited as evidence of an intent to the contrary.
100
  Silence is 
not evidence Congress meant something other than what it said.
101
 
The D.C. Circuit also rejected the government’s argument that the 
broad purposes of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act—near 
universal health insurance coverage and lower costs for such coverage—
evidenced that Congress had no intention to limit tax credits to 
individuals enrolled through State Exchanges.
102
  Despite the fact that the 
individual mandate, the insurance subsidies, and the insurance market 
reforms work together as a cohesive scheme to achieve the legislation’s 
purposes, the legislation itself belies the government’s contention that the 
limitation on the tax credits urged by the appellants would have been 
                                                          
 95.  Id. at 407. 
 96.  Id. (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, ex. rel. Certain of its Members v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 
1088 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).  
 97.  Id. (quoting Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984)). 
 98.  Id. at 407–08. 
 99.  See id. at 408. 
 100.  See id.  In the Explanation of Provisions and Summary of Comments that accompanied the 
issuance of the final regulations, the I.R.S. did not cite to any specific statutory provision, other than 
a general reference to I.R.C. § 36B itself, in support of its position.  Instead, it justified its position 
by reference to “other provisions of the Affordable Care Act” and by the fact that “the relevant 
legislative history does not demonstrate that Congress intended to limit the premium tax credit to 
State Exchanges.”  Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30377, 30378 (May 23, 
2012).  
 101.  Halbig, 758 F.3d at 408.  
 102.  Id. at 408–09. 




  The legislation exempted residents of 
select United States territories from the individual mandate, yet the 
insurance market reforms were made applicable to these territories.
104
  
The adverse selection problem caused by having the insurance reforms 
without a corresponding individual mandate was also in evidence in the 
long-term care provisions of the legislation that Congress repealed in 
2013.
105
  Whether or not Congress tolerated an adverse selection problem 
in the territories because it represented only a small segment of the 
insurance market or whether Congress was willing to tolerate such a 




B. Supreme Court Decision 
On June 25, 2015, in King v. Burwell, the United States Supreme 
Court affirmed the judgment of the Fourth Circuit and held that enrollees 
on Federal Exchanges are indeed entitled to tax credits in a 6-3 
decision.
107
  Justice Roberts, who wrote for the Court, briefly reviewed 
the economic underpinnings of the legislation.  He noted that earlier 
efforts by various states to expand individuals’ access to health insurance 
coverage failed to achieve their objectives.
108
  These efforts coupled 
some form of guarantee issue and community rating requirements to 
assure that health insurance coverage was available to individuals 
seeking coverage and that such coverage was not denied or 
discriminately priced due to pre-existing medical conditions.
109
  
However, these reforms sowed the seeds of their own failure.  Guarantee 
issue and community rating rules assured that insurance would be 
available, at a reasonable price, when needed, thereby exacerbating the 
phenomenon of adverse selection—the propensity for individuals to 
purchase insurance when they become ill.
110
  As a result, the insured pool 
increasingly skewed toward the sick causing premiums to rise and thus 
further encouraging adverse selection.  This process, referred to by Chief 
                                                          
 103.  Id. at 408–10. 
 104.  See id. at 410.   
 105.  Id. at 410.  
 106.  Id. at 411–12. 
 107.  135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015), aff’g 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014).  Justices Scalia, Thomas, 
and Alito dissented.  Id.   
 108.  Id. at 2481–82.  
 109.  Id. at 2482.   
 110.  Id.  See also supra note 21.  
682 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 64 
 
Justice Roberts as a “death spiral,” eventually led to insurers abandoning 




Chief Justice Roberts contrasted the experience of the states of 
Washington and New York, both of which experienced this “death 
spiral” after enacting reforms in the 1990s, with the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts.
112
  Like Washington and New York, Massachusetts 
adopted guarantee issue and community rating requirements in the 
1990s, but unlike her sister states, Massachusetts later required 
individuals to purchase insurance or otherwise face a financial penalty 
and provided tax credits to subsidize the cost of the mandated insurance 
to certain individuals.
113
  These additional measures proved successful, 
and the number of uninsured individuals in Massachusetts fell to the 
lowest rate in the nation.
114
  The combination of guarantee issue and 
community rating to make insurance available, mandatory coverage to 
reduce adverse selection, and subsidies to increase affordability 
underpins the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
115
 
Chief Justice Roberts proceeded to analyze the I.R.S.’s interpretation 
of section 36B.  Unlike the Fourth Circuit, the Court did not examine the 
regulation through the lens of Chevron.
116
  According to the Court, the 
deference afforded administrative agencies in their interpretations of 
statutory ambiguities under Chevron is premised on the notion that such 
ambiguities constitute “an implicit delegation from Congress to the 
agency to fill in the statutory gaps.”
117
  This implication may be 
unwarranted in “extraordinary cases” and, according to the Chief Justice 
Roberts, this legislation is one such case.
118
  Chief Justice Roberts stated: 
The tax credits are among the Act’s key reforms, involving billions of 
dollars in spending each year and affecting the price of health insurance 
for millions of people.  Whether those credits are available on Federal 
Exchanges is thus a question of deep “economic and political 
                                                          
 111.  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2485–86. 
 112.  Id. at 2486. 
 113.  Id.  
 114.  Id. (citing Examining Individual State Experiences with Health Care Reform Coverage 
Initiatives in the Context of National Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, 
& Pensions, 111th Cong. 9 (2009)).  
 115.  Id. at 2493. 
 116.  See id. at 2488–89. 
 117.  Id. at 2488 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 
(2000)). 
 118.  Id. at 2488–89 (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 159). 
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significance” that is central to this statutory scheme; had Congress 
wished to assign that question to an agency, it surely would have done 
so expressly.  It is especially unlikely that Congress would have 
delegated this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in crafting 




The Court noted that statutory language that is plain is enforceable 
according to its terms, but whether such language is, in fact, plain “may 
only become evident when placed in context . . . and with a view to their 
place in the overall statutory scheme.”
120
  The Court examined the 
definitional provisions of the statute and, similar to the Fourth Circuit, 
found that the most natural meaning of the definitional provisions would 
result in no qualified individuals on Federal Exchanges and that Federal 
Exchanges would not be Exchanges at all—results clearly not 
contemplated by the statute.
121
  Moreover, unless Federal Exchanges are 
deemed established under the same statutory provision as State 
Exchanges, none of the statutory requirements are applicable to the 
Federal Exchanges.
122
  In addition, the Court agreed with the Fourth 
Circuit that the information reporting requirements imposed on Federal 




The Court found it possible to interpret the language of section 36B 
either to limit tax credits to enrollees in State Exchanges or to permit 
enrollees on both State and Federal Exchanges to qualify for tax 
credits.
124
  However, the Court determined that the statute intended 
equivalency between the two types of Exchanges.
125
  Denying tax credits 
to enrollees on Federal Exchanges would create a fundamental difference 
                                                          
 119.  Id. at 2489 (citations omitted).  
 120.  Id. (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 132–33).  The admonition 
that language must be placed in context reminds me of a scene from the motion picture, The Paper 
Chase.  THE PAPER CHASE (20th Century Fox 1973), 
http://www.springfieldspringfield.co.uk/movie_script.php?movie=paper-chase-the.  In the scene, a 
third-year law student tutors one of the main characters, a first-year law student.  See id.  The third-
year law student poses a hypothetical case to the first-year law student.  Id.  In the hypothetical, a 
statute requires that premises be maintained so that they are free from dangerous ice.  Id.  Would this 
statute apply if someone slipped on an ice cube in your home?  Id.   
 121.  Id. at 2490–91; see also King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 368–70 (4th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 135 
S. Ct. 2480 (2015).  
 122.  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2491. 
 123.  Id. at 2491–92. 
 124.  Id. at 2491. 
 125.  Id. at 2489. 
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between the two types of Exchanges.
126
  State Exchanges would help 
make health insurance affordable and Federal Exchanges would not.
127
  
The Court rejected the notion that if Congress intended the tax credits to 
be available for qualified individuals enrolled on all Exchanges then the 
words “established by the State” would have been unnecessary.
128
  The 
Court noted that its preference for the avoidance of surplusage is not an 
absolute rule and that the application of such preference was particularly 
unwarranted in this case.
129
  The legislation was poorly drafted due, in 
large part, to the political machinations that were employed in order to 
secure its passage.
130
  Accordingly, the Court found the phrase “an 
Exchange established by the State” to be ambiguous.
131
 
As previously noted, the Court did not defer to the I.R.S. for the 
resolution of the statute’s ambiguity.
132
  Instead, it turned to the broader 
structure of the legislation to clarify the ambiguity.
133
  According to the 
Court, a limitation of tax credits to enrollees on State Exchanges would 
“likely create the very ‘death spirals’ that Congress designed the Act to 
avoid.”
134
  Such an interpretation would run counter to the canon that 
federal statutes cannot be interpreted to negate their own stated 
purpose.
135
  The Court rejected the assertion that Congress believed that 
the absence of tax credits for Federal Exchanges would entice the states 
to establish their own Exchanges.
136
  In contrast, the Court determined 
that the establishment of Federal Exchanges as a response to a state’s 
unwillingness to establish its own Exchange was evidence that Congress 
did, in fact, contemplate state reluctance to cooperate and created a 
fallback to deal with such reluctance.
137
 
Finally, the Court delved into the intricacies of section 36B and 
noted that the denial of tax credits to enrollees on Federal Exchanges, if 
such credits are to be denied, becomes evident only after delving into a 
                                                          
 126.  Id. at 2491. 
 127.  Id.  
 128.  Id. at 2492.  
 129.  Id.  
 130.  See id.   
 131.  Id. at 2491.  
 132.  See supra notes 117–19 and accompanying text. 
 133.  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492. 
 134.  See id. at 2492–93. 
 135.  Id. at 2493 (quoting N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 419–20 
(1973)). 
 136.  See id. at 2494.  
 137.  Id. 
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“sub-sub-sub section” of the statute.
138
  Due to the fundamental 
importance of the tax credits to the overall statutory scheme, the Court 
noted that a congressional intent to deny such credits would have been 
made known in a prominent way and not buried in the interstices of the 
statute.
139
  Invoking Marbury v. Madison, the Court determined its 
resolution of the ambiguity in favor of the government prevented the 




The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, acerbically 
disagreed with the majority’s conclusion.  Justice Scalia wrote that 
Congress could not have “come up with a clearer way to limit tax credits 
to [S]tate Exchanges than to use the words ‘established by the State.’”
141
  
The dissent conceded that statutory interpretation should not take place 
in isolation and that context always is a relevant consideration.
142
  
However, context “is a tool for understanding the terms of the law, not 
an excuse for rewriting them.”
143
  Justice Scalia disagreed with the Chief 
Justice’s belief that the phrase “established by the State” was surplusage 
caused by the circumstances surrounding the passage of the legislation.
144
  
Lawmakers commonly use redundant language, according to Justice 
Scalia, but the majority rendered the phrase in question a nullity thereby 
violating a virtually absolute principle of statutory construction.
145
  
Moreover, this language was repeated seven times throughout the statute, 
but it was not repeated throughout the entire statute.
146
  Common sense 
dictates that the use of a phrase in some cases and another phrase in other 
cases indicates that the two phrases have contrasting meanings.
147
 
The dissent also argued that the majority’s interpretation rendered 
various statutory provisions nonsensical.
148
  Several provisions of the 
legislation mandated state officials to undertake certain tasks related to 
the administration of Exchanges.
149
  The dissent questioned how a state 
                                                          
 138.  Id. at 2495. 
 139.  Id.  
 140.  Id. at 2496.  
 141.  Id. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id.  
 144.  See id. at 2498. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. at 2498–99. 
 147.  Id. at 2499.  
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id. 
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official possibly could undertake those tasks for an Exchange operated 
by the federal government.
150
  The dissent also disagreed that the 
statutory language evidences the intent to treat Federal and State 
Exchanges as equivalent.
151
  Whether or not Federal Exchanges were 
authorized as a fallback in the event of state inertia, a Federal Exchange 
is not a State Exchange.
152
  Invoking the principle that specific terms 
govern over general terms, even if it were true that Congress intended to 
equate the two types of Exchanges in general, for the specific purpose of 
the tax credits the two types of Exchanges are not equivalent. 
153
  The 
fact that a limitation of tax credits to enrollees on State Exchanges would 
leave Federal Exchanges with no qualified individuals did not move the 
dissent.
154
  In fact, the majority’s reliance on this result to come to a 
contrary conclusion was, according to Justice Scalia, “[p]ure 
applesauce.”
155
  The dissent stated: 
Imagine that a university sends around a bulletin reminding every 
professor to take the “interests of graduate students” into account when 
setting office hours, but that some professors teach only 
undergraduates.  Would anybody reason that the bulletin implicitly 
presupposes that every professor has “graduate students” so that 
“graduate students” must really mean “graduate or undergraduate 
students”?  Surely not.  Just as one naturally reads instructions about 
graduate students to be inapplicable to the extent a particular professor 
has no such students, so too would one naturally read instructions about 
qualified individuals to be inapplicable to the extent a particular 




Moreover, the dissent, unlike the majority, found nothing unusual in 
the structure of section 36B.  The fact that the limitation of tax credits to 
enrollees on State Exchanges, if such limitation did indeed apply, is 
found in a formula provision—a sub-sub-sub section according to the 
majority—rather than a definitional provision is of no moment.
157
  Such 
                                                          
 150.  Id.   
 151.  See id. 
 152.  See id. at 2500. 
 153.  Id.  The dissent drew an analogy to Article I, section 4 of the Constitution that the 
dissenting Justices believed authorized Congress to regulate elections as a fallback to state action.  
Id. at 2499–2500. 
 154.  Id. at 2501. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id.  
 157.  Id. at 2495, 2501–02.  
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drafting is not unusual in the Internal Revenue Code.
158
 
Justice Scalia then directed his attention to the legislation’s design 
and purpose and was similarly critical of the majority’s conclusions in 
this respect.
159
  The notion that the health insurance market would be 
destabilized by the lack of tax subsidies to enrollees on Federal 
Exchanges, if true, merely reveals a flaw in the law and is not proof that 
the statute does not mean what it says.
160
  Moreover, this flaw existed, 
without dispute, in the long-term care insurance program established by 
the legislation and in the general insurance market in the Federal 
Territories.
161
  Justice Scalia proceeded to accuse the majority of 
considering the law’s “purpose[s] in isolation” and ignoring other 
competing purposes.
162
  The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
displays “a congressional preference for state participation in the 
establishment [and management] of Exchanges.”
163
  The majority’s 
conclusion frustrates this goal.
164
  In fact, a contrary holding would 
encourage states to establish their own Exchanges thereby achieving the 
market reforms desired with active state participation.
165
 
Finally, the dissent took umbrage at the majority’s reaction to its 
conclusion that this dispute was the result of inartful drafting caused, in 
part, by Congress’s lack of due care and deliberation.
166
  It is not the role 
of the Court to amend a law that says what Congress did not intend to 
say or “to make everything come out right when Congress does not do its 
job properly.”
167
  Justice Scalia, referring to this case and National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, concluded by accusing 
the majority of results-driven jurisprudence.
168
  “We should start calling 
this law SCOTUScare. . . .  And the cases will publish forever the 
discouraging truth that the Supreme Court of the United States favors 
some laws over others, and is prepared to do whatever it takes to uphold 
and assist its favorites.”
169
 
                                                          
 158.  Id. at 2501–02 (referring to several other tax credit provisions). 
 159.  Id. at 2502–04. 
 160.  Id. at 2503.  
 161.  Id.  
 162.  Id. at 2504. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id.   
 165.  Id.  
 166.  See id. at 2492, 2506. 
 167.  Id. at 2506. 
 168.  Id. at 2505–06. 
 169.  Id. at 2507.  This opinion is shared by the Wall Street Journal.  See Opinion, The Political 
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Both the majority and dissenting opinions, enlisting as they did an 
array of canons of statutory interpretation, are persuasive.  I suspect I am 
not the only person whose agreement or disagreement with the Court’s 
holding is largely dependent on pre-existing policy preferences and, 
perhaps, political ideology.  However, the Court’s handling of the 
Chevron issue raises troubling separation of powers issues.  Moreover, 
the Court’s standing jurisprudence is difficult to square with its handling 
of this issue. 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Chevron and the “Extraordinary” Case 
Prior to the Court’s decision in Chevron, a multi-factor test was 
applied to tax regulations to determine whether such regulations 
permissibly construed a statute.
170
  For almost thirty years after Chevron, 
deference shown to I.R.S. rulemaking depended on whether the 
regulations were issued pursuant to a specific statutory grant of authority 
or pursuant to the general grant of congressional authority under Internal 
Revenue Code section 7805.
171
  In 2011, in Mayo Foundation for 
Medical Education & Research v. United States, the Court no longer 
predicated the level of deference to which tax regulations were entitled 
on the source of their authority.
172
  Mayo presented the question whether 
physicians who serve as medical residents were entitled to a student 
exemption from certain federal payroll taxes.
173
  The I.R.S. promulgated 
a regulation pursuant to the general grant of authority under section 7805 
that denied medical residents an exemption from the applicable payroll 




The Court forcefully rejected the notion that tax regulations are 
somehow entitled to less deference than the regulatory action of other 
agencies: 
. . . Mayo has not advanced any justification for applying a less 
deferential standard of review to Treasury Department regulations than 
                                                          
John Roberts, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2015, at A12.  
 170.  See supra note 69 (discussing the National Muffler test).  
 171.  Id.  
 172.  562 U.S. 44, 57 (2011). 
 173.  Id. at 52. 
 174.  Id. at 58–60.  See also I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2012). 
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we apply to the rules of any other agency.  In the absence of such 
justification, we are not inclined to carve out an approach to 
administrative review good for tax law only.  To the contrary, we have 
expressly “[r]ecogniz[ed] the importance of maintaining a uniform 
approach to judicial review of administrative action.” . . .  Filling gaps 
in the Internal Revenue Code plainly requires the Treasury Department 
to make interpretive choices for statutory implementation at least as 
complex as the ones other agencies must make in administering their 
statutes. . . .  We see no reason why our review of tax regulations 
should not be guided by agency expertise pursuant to Chevron to the 




The Court refused to apply Chevron to the Treasury regulation that 
entitled qualified enrollees on Federal Exchanges to tax credits.
176
  
According to the Court, Chevron deference is underpinned by the notion 
that statutory ambiguities carry with them an express or implicit 
delegation of authority by Congress to the executive branch to resolve 
such ambiguities.
177
  However, in extraordinary cases, this delegation of 
authority cannot be assumed.
178
  The Court, citing FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., asserted that the issue presented in the case 
was too central to the functioning of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act for Congress to have left it to the I.R.S. to 
resolve.
179
  Moreover, the Court’s assertion was buttressed by the lack of 
I.R.S. expertise in crafting or enforcing health care policy—an assertion 
not shared by the Fourth Circuit.
180
 
The Court’s reasoning for its refusal to apply Chevron in this case is 
troubling in two respects.  First, the importance of an issue should not be 
used as conclusive evidence of congressional intent on an issue.  Instead, 
a court should consider this factor only if there is no discernable 
congressional intent with respect to an issue.  Second, the Court’s 
introduction of agency expertise as a factor for consideration in 
resolution of this issue may very well serve to undo much of what Mayo 
                                                          
 175.  Id. at 55–56. 
 176.  See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text.  
 177.  Id.  
 178.  Id.  The D.C. Circuit has held that the failure of a statute to affirmatively withhold authority 
from a regulatory agency does not support the presumption that such authority was, in fact, 
delegated by Congress to a regulatory agency.  See Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 
29 F.3d 655, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also Am. Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 468 (D.C. Cir. 
2005).  
 179.  See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 180.  See supra notes 69, 119 and accompanying text. 
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did with respect to the status of Treasury regulations. 
The Court has, in effect, used the issue of congressional delegation 
as part of a feedback loop used to resolve step one of Chevron: if a 
statute is ambiguous, we then determine if the issue’s importance belies 
congressional delegation of authority and then we determine that there is, 
in fact, no ambiguity.  Consequently, Chevron step two is not invoked.  
For example, in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. the issue 
before the Court was whether the FDA had the authority to regulate 
tobacco products: 
Finally, our inquiry into whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue is shaped, at least in some measure, by the 
nature of the question presented.  Deference under Chevron to an 
agency’s construction of a statute that it administers is premised on the 
theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from 
Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps.  In extraordinary 
cases, however, there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that 




The nature of the question presented should have no bearing on a 
court’s inquiry into whether Congress has spoken directly to the precise 
question at issue but should bear only on the determination whether the 
issue was delegated to an agency to resolve.  The above quoted statement 
can be taken to mean that the courts’ level of effort in ascertaining 
whether Congress has spoken to the issue depends on the nature of the 
question presented.  Alternatively, it could be taken to mean that courts 
must find that Congress has spoken on the issue if the question presented 
is of significant importance.  Neither meaning is comforting. 
 The statement quoted above was made after the Court explained in 
twenty-three pages of its opinion that Congress indeed had foreclosed the 
FDA from regulating tobacco products.
182
  It should have made no 
difference that this case was extraordinary.  Congress’s intent, as the 
Court exhaustively made evident, was clear.  Likewise, after parsing the 
statute as a whole, the Court came to the conclusion that Congress 
                                                          
 181.  529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000).  The Court also quoted from a law review article written by 
Justice Breyer before he was confirmed to the Court.  Id.  “A court may also ask whether the legal 
question is an important one.  Congress is more likely to have focused upon, and answered, major 
questions, while leaving interstitial matters to answer themselves in the course of the statute’s daily 
administration.”  Id. (quoting Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 
ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986)). 
 182.  Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 133–56.  
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intended to make tax credits available to enrollees on Federal Exchanges.  
At that point, there is no ambiguity and the importance of the issue at 
hand is irrelevant. 
The Court in Chevron determined that an ambiguity existed in the 
statute and that the EPA’s resolution of the ambiguity was a reasonable 
accommodation of competing policy interests.
183
  The Court then noted 
that “[i]f this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of 
conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care by the 
statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its 
legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress 
would have sanctioned.”
184
  The Court failed to explain how an 
accommodation that Congress would not have sanctioned could ever be a 
“reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed 
to the agency’s care.”
185
  Either the issue was committed to the agency’s 
care or it was not. 
Jonathan Adler and Michael Cannon stated the following in their 
seminal article that gave prominence to the issue in King v. Burwell: 
Suppose, however, the IRS was able to convince a reviewing court that 
the PPACA is ambiguous on whether it limits tax credits to state-based 
Exchanges.  The IRS would also need to demonstrate that this 
ambiguity was evidence of an implicit delegation of authority to 
interpret the statute in a way that would authorize the creation of new 
tax credits, new entitlement spending, and new taxes on employers and 
individuals beyond the purview of the traditional legislative 
appropriations process.  This is not the sort of authority one should 
lightly presume Congress delegated to an agency.  To paraphrase the 




If Congress indeed does not hide such “elephants in mouseholes,” 
then I fail to ascertain how the I.R.S. could convince a reviewing court 
that an ambiguity exists to justify its action. Whether an issue is 
important is not relevant if Congress intended a particular result. 
Under Chevron, a court first must determine whether or not the 
statute evidences a congressional intent with respect to the matter at 
                                                          
 183.  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
 184.  Id. at 845 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U. S. 374, 382–83 (1961)). 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Jonathan H. Adler & Michael F. Cannon, Taxation Without Representation: The Illegal IRS 
Rule to Expand Tax Credits Under the PPACA, 23 HEALTH MATRIX 119, 180 (2013) (quoting 
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)). 




  Clarity of statutory language is, of course, the best evidence of 
such intent.  For example, had section 36B stated that tax credits are 
available to eligible individuals enrolled on “any Exchange,”  “an 
Exchange established by a State or the Federal government,” or, 
conversely, “an Exchange established by a State (but not the Federal 
government or any instrumentality therefor)” the intent of Congress 
would have been clearly manifested by the statutory language.  In many 
cases, Congress does not reveal its intent so obviously.  Whether or not 
the statutory language plainly reveals Congress’s intent is, of course, 
subject to debate, and the various axioms of statutory construction exist 
to assist a court in the revelation of such intent. 
King v. Burwell may very well find a place in the casebooks that 
teach statutory interpretation.  The majority, in support of its position, 
used, by my count, three canons of statutory construction: the words of a 
statute must be read in context and given their place in the overall 
statutory scheme; federal statutes cannot be interpreted to negate their 
own stated purposes; and fundamental details of a regulatory scheme are 
not altered in vague or ancillary provisions.
188
  The importance of the 
first canon noted—contextual analysis—to Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Kennedy apparently varies from case-to-case.  In the recent case 
of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., ironically another case that 
involved the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, both Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy placed significant emphasis on the 
Dictionary Act’s definition of “person” in reaching the conclusion that 




Not to be outdone, the dissent in King v. Burwell put forth its own set 
of canons to refute the majority’s conclusion: the plain and obvious 
                                                          
 187.  Prior to Chevron, the courts did give significant weight to administrative agencies’ 
reasonable interpretation of legislation.  However, the courts were not consistent in this respect.  See 
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 
512–13 (1989). 
 188.  See supra notes 120, 136, 139 and accompanying texts. 
 189.  134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768–70 (2014).  The issue in this case was whether the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act was applicable to three closely-held corporations so that the contraception 
coverage mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was not applicable to such 
corporations.  Id. at 2740.  The Court held that the corporations were not subject to the mandate 
because the imposition of the mandate on such corporations violated the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act.  See id. at 2759.  Ascertaining the meaning of terms by reference to other parts of 
the law or to the structure of the law as a whole is an approach often useful in ascertaining the 
meaning of the Constitution.  See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 
747 (1999).  
2016 KING V. BURWELL AND THE CHEVRON DOCTRINE 693 
 
meaning of a statute is preferable to other meanings; it is presumed that 
lawmakers use words in their natural and ordinary signification; 
lawmakers do not use terms that have no operation at all; and specific 
terms govern over general terms.
190
  The enlistment of these tools by 
both the majority and the dissent was made for one purpose—to answer 
the question of whether Congress intended for tax credits to be available 
to enrollees on Federal Exchanges.
191
 
Chief Justice Roberts stated that the meaning of the term 
“established by the State” was ambiguous because such term reasonably 
could be interpreted in two ways.
192
  He then proceeded to explain why 
Congress intended for such a term to encompass Federal Exchanges.
193
  
At this point, there is no more ambiguity.  Chevron requires a court to 
determine whether the intent of Congress is ambiguous.  Ambiguity of 
language is not the same thing as ambiguity of intent.  In addition to the 
various canons of statutory interpretation, congressional intent can be 
gleaned from extraneous sources such as other legislation.  The Court, in 
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., exhaustively examined 
other congressional actions in determining whether Congress intended to 
provide the FDA with regulatory authority over tobacco.
194
  The 
importance of the issue to an overall regulatory scheme or to the 
economy or to some other important matter is but a factor in the courts’ 
inquiry with respect to congressional intent, but an issue’s importance 
should not be treated as de facto evidence that such intent existed.  To do 
so provides the judiciary with an excuse to substitute its policy 
preferences for those of Congress.  After all, Congress may not have 
intended to delegate an issue to an agency, but it surely did not intend to 
delegate it to a court. 
Ambiguity of statutory language represents either a lack of clarity on 
the part of the legislature in making its intent known or a lack of intent 
with respect to the issue at hand.  The more critical and central a seeming 
ambiguity is to a regulatory scheme the more likely it is that the 
legislature intended a particular result.  This is a common-sense 
                                                          
 190.  King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2497–2500 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 191.  It has been suggested that this case also concerned two broader issues—the manner in 
which legislation is drafted and debated and the appropriateness of increasing the compliance burden 
on an already overburdened I.R.S.  See Armando Gomez, Why Should Tax Lawyers Care About 
King v. Burwell?, 6 COLUM. J. TAX L. TAX MATTERS 4, 5 (2015).  Whether or not the Court could 
have, or should have, considered those issues is beyond the scope of this work.  
 192.  See supra text accompanying note 124; King, 135 S. Ct. at 2491. 
 193.  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2491–95. 
 194.  See 529 U.S. 120, 133–56 (2000).  
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assumption.  The judiciary is tasked to determine what the law is and, in 
carrying out this task, the underlying policy or policies furthered by the 
law is fair game for judicial consideration.  The separation of powers 
justification for Chevron deference does not diminish the courts’ role in 
examining policy but, in fact, supports it.  After all, if Congress chose 
not to delegate authority to the executive branch, then the judiciary 
should not grant such authority to the executive branch through the 
Chevron back door.  Conversely, if the executive branch has been 
delegated authority, then the judiciary should not substitute its own 
policy judgments for the judgment of the branch of government to which 
Congress deferred. 
However, in many circumstances Congress has given no thought at 
all to the matter for one of two reasons.  First, the matter either is one of 
implementation or is one that implicates the application of a rule to one 
of many possible fact patterns potentially covered by the rule that 
Congress passed off to an agency.  It is precisely these situations that 
justify Chevron deference.  The regulatory agencies have the policy and 
technical expertise to deal with such situations.  Perhaps more 
importantly, the agencies are politically accountable through the elected 
executive branch officials, provide constituent participation through 
notice and comment procedures,
195
 and have the flexibility to alter their 
positions as circumstances warrant. 
Second, Congress never contemplated the issue at all, and the 
importance of the issue raised makes it doubtful that Congress intended 
to leave the issue for the agency to resolve.  It is quite possible that 
social, technological, or other developments present a fact pattern that 
the legislature could have not foreseen.  I concur with the Court that 
Chevron deference should not apply to these situations.  However, in 
such situations, the Court should not substitute its own policy 
preferences in the guise of a congressional intent that did not exist.  In 
such cases, the courts should not enforce the regulations in question and 
leave the matter to Congress. 
Whether an issue’s importance negates or implies congressional 
delegation will itself be a difficult issue.  One would think that King v. 
Burwell was an easy case in this respect.  Not all disputes will be so 
obvious and so obviously important.  Whether enrollees on Federal 
                                                          
 195.  Chevron is applicable only to tax regulations issued with notice and comment.  Informal 
guidance, such as Revenue Rulings, are subject to a less deferential standard.  Positions advanced for 
the purposes of litigation and not previously published are also subject to a less deferential standard.  
See supra note 69; see also Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988).  
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Exchanges qualify for tax credits is critical to the operation of the health 
care reform sought by the legislation, is not an obscure issue, and is not 
an issue that arose from a set of facts not contemplated by Congress.  
Precisely what Congress intended in this respect is subject to debate—as 
evidenced by the vigorous dissent in this case, but it is difficult to dispute 
the far-reaching consequences of the resolution of this dispute.  Yet, in 
contrast to the Court, the Fourth Circuit believed that the very 
importance of the issue implied that Congress delegated its resolution to 
the I.R.S.
196
  The fact that two courts drew opposite conclusions with 
respect to whether there was an implicit delegation of authority in this 
case illustrates the difficulty of ascertaining just what Congress had in 
mind. 
For example, let us suppose that the phrase “established by the State 
but not by the federal government or any instrumentality thereof” 
replaced the language presently found in section 36B and that the statute 
and legislative history made no mention of the possibility that states and 
the federal government could partner to operate an Exchange.  Suppose 
further that the Treasury Department issued regulations that defined an 
Exchange “established by the State but not by the federal government or 
any instrumentality thereof” to include Exchanges that were operated by 
states in partnership with the Department of Health and Human 
Services.
197
  This regulation would satisfy both the policy goal of 
insurance affordability and the policy goal of state participation.  In the 
event Congress contemplated that states would either form an Exchange 
or would not participate at all, the possibility of partial participation by a 
state in operating an Exchange would not have occurred to Congress at 
the time the legislation was deliberated and enacted.  However, the 
importance of this issue to the overall statutory scheme would be 
significant if a great number of states chose to partner with the 
Department of Health and Human Services.  Whether it is of such import 
to negate the implication that Congress intended the Treasury 
Department to deal with such a development is unclear.  If it did, then 
Chevron deference should accrue to the regulation in question.  If not, 
then the Court should not fabricate a congressional intent when none 
existed, and it should strike down the regulation. 
A troubling aspect of the majority opinion was the question of the 
I.R.S.’s expertise.  Chief Justice Roberts remarked that congressional 
                                                          
 196.  See King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 373 n.4 (4th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).  
 197.  See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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delegation of a matter so central to the operation of health insurance 
reform as the qualification for tax subsidies was unlikely.
198
  He went on 
to state that the delegation of such a matter to the I.R.S. was even more 
unlikely given its lack of expertise in health care policy.
199
  This 
statement—perhaps intended for effect—could undermine the equipoise 
that Mayo provided between the I.R.S. and other federal agencies.
200
  
Agency expertise is one factor that supports Chevron deference—a factor 
that is, perhaps, all the more justified in an increasingly complex 
society.
201
  Justice Ginsburg recently stated that “[t]he expert agency is 
surely better equipped to do the job than individual district judges issuing 
ad hoc, case-by-case injunctions.  Federal judges lack the scientific, 
economic, and technological resources an agency can utilize in coping 
with issues of this order.”
202
 
However, tax legislation often is enacted to serve policy goals 
unrelated to revenue collection.  For example, housing, education, health 
care, and retirement security policy goals are served, in part, through the 
tax system.
203
  Will the I.R.S.’s lack of expertise in these areas somehow 
subject its regulations to greater scrutiny?  Does the fact that Congress 
expressly delegated regulatory authority to the I.R.S. in these areas 
inhibit the courts from considering this issue, or will the courts heighten 
their efforts to find the issue at hand too important to have been part of 
that express delegation?  After all, section 36B did contain an express 
grant of regulatory authority that the Court found could not have 
encompassed the authority to determine who is eligible for tax credits.
204
  
Arguably, the Court now has resorted to second-guessing the wisdom of 
Congress not for its delegation of authority, but for its choice of agency 
to which such authority was delegated.
205
 
                                                          
 198.  See supra text accompanying note 119.  
 199.  Id.  
 200.  See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 201.  See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 865 (1984).   
 202.  Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2539–40 (2011).  
 203.  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 25A (2012) (providing a credit for certain educational expenses); Id. § 36 
(providing a credit for first time homebuyers); Id. § 105 (providing an exclusion for employer 
provided medical insurance); Id. § 213 (providing a deduction for medical and dental expenses); Id. 
§§ 401–09 (providing tax deferred retirement vehicles).  
 204.  See supra notes 69, 117–19 and accompanying text. 
 205.  Perhaps the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act prompts the Court to slight the 
separation of powers.  As noted at supra note 41, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. involved the 
application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to three closely-held corporations whose 
shareholders objected, on religious grounds, to the provision of certain contraceptive services 
mandated by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.  134 S. Ct. 2751, 2755 (2014).  Under 
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1. Illustrative Examples 
Two relatively recent tax issues illustrate the application of Chevron 
to situations that Congress, most likely, did not contemplate.  The first 
example, relating to the nuances of the mortgage interest deduction, is 
unlikely and extraordinary.  The second example deals with the 
application of the gift tax to contributions to social welfare organizations 
to support political activity.  This issue may very well be deemed 
extraordinary. 
a. Mortgage Interest Deduction 
In general, taxpayers, other than corporations, may not deduct 
personal interest paid or accrued during the taxable year.
206
  However, 
excluded from the definition of personal interest is qualified residence 
interest.
207
  Qualified residence interest is defined as interest that is paid 
or accrued during the taxable year either on “acquisition indebtedness 
with respect to any qualified residence of the taxpayer” or on “home 
equity indebtedness with respect to any qualified residence of the 
taxpayer.”
208
  The amount of acquisition indebtedness and home equity 
indebtedness is limited to $1,000,000 and $100,000, respectively.
209
  For 
                                                          
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, federal government action that substantially burdens the 
exercise of person’s religion must be justified by a compelling government interest and provide the 
least restrictive means of achieving this interest.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012).  The Court 
believed that direct government payment for the disputed services was a least restrictive means of 
achieving the objectives of the contraception mandate.  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2780.  
“The most straightforward way of doing this would be for the Government to assume the cost of 
providing the four contraceptives at issue to any women who are unable to obtain them under their 
health-insurance policies due to their employers’ religious objections.”  Id.  The Department of 
Health & Human Services did not produce statistics to refute the Court’s assumption that the cost of 
such coverage to the government would be minor.  Id. at 2780–81.  This was a bold pronouncement 
by the Court because the same can be said of various government benefits.  This reasoning would 
require that, for any program not expressly exempted from Religious Freedom Restoration Act’s 
requirements, the government either must anticipate religious objections and score the cost of 
providing direct government funding or be prepared to do so in litigation.  Moreover, the short-term 
costs of government funding do not take into account dynamic factors such as the effect that 
modifications to existing programs will have on market prices and on the behavior of the market 
participants—factors often beyond the predictive ability of the administrative agencies with 
specialized expertise in the area in question let alone a court. 
 206.  I.R.C. § 163(h)(1). 
 207.  Id. § 163(h)(2)(D). 
 208.  Id. § 163(h)(3).  A qualified residence is the taxpayer’s principal residence, as defined in 
section 121, and one other residence, as defined in section 280A(d)(1), selected by the taxpayer.  Id. 
§ 163(h)(4)(A)(i). 
 209.  The statutory definitions of acquisition indebtedness and home equity indebtedness and the 
limitations thereon are as follows: 
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A relatively recent Tax Court case, Sophy v. Commissioner,
211
 dealt 
with the issue of whether the limitations on the amount of debt the 
interest on which qualifies for the mortgage interest deduction apply on a 
per-residence or per-taxpayer basis.  Charles Sophy and his domestic 
partner each deducted an amount of interest on their individual tax 
returns that was determined under the assumption that the dollar 
limitations on the amounts of acquisition indebtedness and home equity 
indebtedness were available to each in full.  In the aggregate, the debt on 
which the interest deductions were based exceeded the statutory dollar 
limits.  Consistent with informal guidance that it previously issued, the 
I.R.S. asserted that the dollar limitations on acquisition and home equity 
indebtedness are applicable on a per-residence basis and not a per-
taxpayer basis.
212
  The Tax Court, based on statutory construction, held 
for the I.R.S. and applied the limitations on a per-residence basis.
213
 
                                                          
Section 163(h)(3)(B) Acquisition indebtedness.  
(i) In general.  The term “acquisition indebtedness” means any indebtedness which- 
(I) is incurred in acquiring, constructing, or substantially improving any qualified 
residence of the taxpayer, and 
(II) is secured by such residence.  Such term also includes any indebtedness secured 
by such residence resulting from the refinancing of indebtedness meeting the 
requirements of the preceding sentence (or this sentence); but only to the extent the 
amount of the indebtedness resulting from such refinancing does not exceed the 
amount of the refinanced indebtedness. 
(ii) $1,000,000 limitation.  The aggregate amount treated as acquisition indebtedness for 
any period shall not exceed $1,000,000 ($500,000 in the case of a married individual 
filing a separate return). 
Section 163(h)(3)(C) Home equity indebtedness. 
(i) In general.  The term “home equity indebtedness” means any indebtedness (other than 
acquisition indebtedness) secured by a qualified residence to the extent the aggregate 
amount of such indebtedness does not exceed- 
(I) the fair market value of such qualified residence, reduced by 
(II) the amount of acquisition indebtedness with respect to such residence. 
(ii) Limitation.  The aggregate amount treated as home equity indebtedness for any period 
shall not exceed $100,000 ($50,000 in the case of a separate return by a married 
individual). 
Id. §§ 163(h)(3)(B)(ii), (h)(3)(C)(ii).  
 210.  Id.  
 211.  138 T.C. 204, 209 (2012).  The Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court. Voss v. Comm’r, 796 
F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2015); see infra note 214.  
 212.  Sophy, 138 T.C. at 212.  On March 13, 2009, the I.R.S. released Chief Counsel Advice 
Memoranda 2009-11-007 in which it took the position that the $1,000,000 limitation on acquisition 
indebtedness is applied on a per-residence basis and not on a per-taxpayer basis.  I.R.S. Chief 
Counsel Advice Mem., IRS CCA 200911007 (Nov. 24, 2008).  
 213.  According to the court, the possessive phrases “of the taxpayer” in both the definitions of 
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An equally plausible reading of the statute leads to the opposite 
conclusion than that reached by the Tax Court.  Section 163(h)(3)(B)(i) 
states that “[t]he term ‘acquisition indebtedness’ means any indebtedness 
which is incurred in acquiring, constructing, or substantially improving 
any qualified residence of the taxpayer and is secured by such 
residence.”
214
  Each party incurred debt to acquire a qualified residence, 
and each party’s debt was secured by such residence.
215
  The definitional 
provisions are applied on a per taxpayer basis.  Whether a debt meets the 
statutory definition is determined by whether the taxpayer incurred the 
debt to acquire, construct, or substantially improve a property whose use 
by the taxpayer qualifies the debt under the statute.  For example, a co-
tenancy could involve the use of the house by one co-tenant as a 
principal residence and the use by the other co-tenant as an investment.  
In such circumstances, whether the debt to acquire the property qualifies 
as acquisition indebtedness under § 163(h)(2)(D) is determined by each 
taxpayer individually. 
Section 163(h)(3)(B)(ii), the limitation provision, is just that—a 
limitation provision.  As a limiting provision, it merely establishes a limit 
that is applied to debt that otherwise meets the requirements of the 
definitional section.  The Tax Court’s interpretation of the statute inserts 
a substantive provision—an aggregate limit on the total debt secured by 
the residence—within the limitation provision.  Finally, the reduced debt 
                                                          
acquisition indebtedness and home equity indebtedness refer to the residence and not the debt.  
Sophy, 138 T.C. at 212.  Thus, the reference “of the taxpayer” in the phrase that defines acquisition 
indebtedness as any debt “incurred in acquiring, constructing, or substantially improving any 
qualified residence of the taxpayer” should be interpreted not to refer to the debt of the taxpayer but 
to the residence of the taxpayer.  Id. at 208, 210, 211 (emphasis added).  The court believed that the 
statute’s reference to “any debt” is not qualified by any language relating to a particular taxpayer.  
Id. at 210.  Therefore, the dollar limitations on acquisition indebtedness and home equity 
indebtedness should be interpreted to limit the total amount of debt with respect to a particular 
residence and not the total amount of debt incurred by a particular taxpayer.  Id. at 211.  The court 
opined that the repeated references to “the taxpayer” throughout § 163(h) but its conspicuous 
absence in the debt limitation provisions was evidence that Congress did not intend the limitations to 
be applied on a per-taxpayer basis.  Id.  The court also found support for its position in the 
parenthetical language of § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii) and § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii) which halve the limitations for 
married taxpayers that file separate returns.  Id. at 212.  This language implies that married couples 
that file a joint return are subject to the $1,100,000 limitation as a couple.  Id.  The court dismissed 
the argument that the limitations imposed on married couples that file separate returns are a form of 
“marriage penalty.”  Id. at 212–13.  Instead, the court interpreted these limitations as a mandatory 
allocation of the total limitations among spouses that file separate tax returns.  Id. at 213. 
 214.  I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(i)(I)–(II).  Similar language applies to home equity indebtedness.  
For the sake of simplicity, the discussion is limited to acquisition indebtedness.  The Ninth Circuit 
believed that this interpretation of the statute was correct and recently reversed the Tax Court.  See 
Voss v. Comm’r, 796 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015).  
 215.  Sophy, 138 T.C. at 205.   
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limits on married couples that file separate returns can be interpreted to 
imply that a married couple that does file a joint return is treated as one 
taxpayer, and this provision places married couples not so filing on the 
same footing.  If so, then the reason that married couples that file jointly 
are limited in the aggregate to the debt limitations is not because the 
limitations are determined on a per-residence basis but because joint 
filers are treated as one taxpayer. 
b. Gift Tax and Social Welfare Organizations 
A federal gift tax is imposed for each calendar year on the transfer of 
property by gift by any individual during such calendar year.
216
  The gift 
tax, introduced by the Revenue Act of 1924, supplements the federal 
estate tax, and it prevents individuals from avoiding the imposition of a 
wealth transfer tax through lifetime transfers.
217
  Among the various 
transfers that are either exempt from the gift tax or are deductible in 
arriving at the total of taxable gifts are transfers of money or property to 
section 527 political organizations.
218
  This exception, effective for 
transfers made after May 7, 1974, was enacted in 1975.
219
 
Neither an exemption nor a deduction is provided for gifts made to 
                                                          
 216.  I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1).  The gift tax is imposed on the donor.  Id. § 2502(c).   
 217.  See Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 282, 286 (1933).  The constitutionality of wealth 
transfer taxes was settled long ago.  See Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. 331, 349–50 (1875); Knowlton v. 
Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 81–82 (1900); Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 137–38 (1929).  The gift 
tax was repealed in 1926 but reenacted in 1932 with the passage of the Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. 
No. 72-154, § 501, 47 Stat 169, 245 (1932).  A unified credit against the donor’s tax liability is 
provided.  I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2505.  The credit is a statutory amount, adjusted annually for inflation, 
which is available to offset lifetime gift tax or testamentary estate tax liability.  Id.  Effective in 
2015, the unified credit will shelter tax liability on cumulative lifetime and testamentary transfers up 
to $5,430,000.  See Rev. Proc. 2014-61, § 3.33, 2014-47 I.R.B. 860.  The unified credit has been 
made permanently portable among spouses.  See id. § 2010(c)(4).  A surviving spouse, absent an 
election to the contrary by the executor of the deceased, automatically succeeds to any unused 
unified credit of the deceased spouse.  Id.  Therefore, an individual conceivably could shelter up to 
$10,860,000 of asset transfers from gift and estate tax liability.  See id. 
 218.  I.R.C. § 2501(a)(4).  These organizations are parties, committees, associations, funds, or 
other incorporated or unincorporated organizations that are organized and operated for the purpose 
of accepting contributions and making expenditures to influence, or attempt to influence, the 
selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any individual to any Federal, State, or local 
public office or office in a political organization, or the election of Presidential or Vice-Presidential 
electors.  Id. § 527(e)(1)–(2). 
 219.  Pub. L. No. 93-625, § 14, 88 Stat. 2108, 2121 (1975) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 
2501(a)(5)).  Several other transfers are not included in the taxable gift total for the taxable year.  
Annual gifts of $14,000 per donee are not considered gifts made during the taxable year.  See I.R.C. 
§ 2503(b)(1); Rev. Proc. 2014-61, § 3.35(1), 2014-47 I.R.B. 860.  Various other transfers are not 
deemed gifts or are deductible in arriving at the total of taxable gifts.  See I.R.C. §§ 2503(e), 
2503(g), 2516, 2518, 2522, 2523.  
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section 501(c)(4) organizations.  These organizations are a form of tax-
exempt organization operated exclusively for the promotion of social 
welfare.
220
  Section 501(c)(4) organizations may engage in political 
campaigns provided that such activity does not constitute the 
organization’s primary activity.
221
  These organizations have become 
increasingly important players in political campaigns because they are 
not subject to the reporting and disclosure requirements imposed on 
section 527 organizations. 
Congress failed to define the term “gift,” and Treasury regulations 
define the term expansively.  For gift tax purposes, gifts are not limited 
to transfers of property made with detached and disinterested generosity, 
and donative intent on the part of the transferor is not an essential 
element in the application of the tax.
222
  Moreover, if the consideration 
received in a transaction cannot be reduced to a value in money or 
money’s worth, such as love or affection, then such consideration is to be 
wholly disregarded and the transaction considered a gift in its entirety.
223
  
However, a sale or exchange, or other transfer of property made in the 
ordinary course of business is deemed to have been made for adequate 
and full consideration in money or money’s worth.
224
  The Supreme 
Court noted that “Congress intended to use the term ‘gifts’ in its broadest 
and most comprehensive sense . . . to hit all the protean arrangements 
which the wit of man can devise that are not business transactions within 
                                                          
 220.  I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(A).  
 221.  A § 501(c)(4) organization “is operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare if it 
is primarily engaged in promoting in some way the common good and general welfare of the people 
of the community.”  Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (2012) (emphasis added).  Proposed 
regulations were issued that would expand the types of activities that cannot be within the scope of 
an organization’s primary activities.  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii), 78 Fed. Reg. 71535 
(Nov. 29, 2013).  The preamble to the proposed rules indicates that the ability of these organizations 
to engage in political activity provided that such activity is not their primary activity is also under 
review.  See id. 
 222.  Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g)(1) (as amended in 1997). 
 223.  Id.  See also Wiedemann v. Comm’r, 26 T.C. 565, 570 (1956) (holding that payments to 
support an adult child were gifts); Rev. Rul. 79-384, 1979-2 C.B. 344 (ruling that a payment in 
satisfaction of a promise to graduate from college was a gift). 
 224.  Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1992).  The courts have held that the ordinary course of business 
exception applies to transactions for which the transferor lacked donative intent despite the fact that 
the transaction in question was not a business transaction in any conventional sense.  See, e.g., Harris 
v. Comm’r, 340 U.S. 106, 112 (1950); see also Rev. Rul. 68-558, 1968-2 C.B. 415 (ruling that the 
sale of land at a below market price by a group of individuals to a corporation in order to induce the 
transferee to operate a manufacturing facility in the community was not a gift).  The Tax Court, on 
several occasions, has stated that a bona-fide transfer at arm’s length and free of donative intent 
qualifies for the ordinary business exception regardless of whether the transaction is a business 
transaction.  See, e.g., Estate of Cullison v. Comm’r, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2490 (1998); Estate of 
Berkman v. Comm’r, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 183 (1979). 
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the meaning of ordinary speech.”
225
  The Court also stated “absent an 
express exclusion from its provisions, any transfer meeting the statutory 
requirements must be held subject to the gift tax.”
226
 
The sparse case law with respect to the application of the gift tax to 
political contributions prior to 1975 is marked by inconsistency.
227
  In 
Stern v. United States, the district court held that political contributions 
were made in return for full and adequate consideration, and thus were 
not gifts, because the taxpayer was not motivated by “affection, respect, 
admiration, charity, or like impulses” but instead made the contributions 




In Carson v. Commissioner, the Tax Court held that political 
contributions made by the petitioners to various candidates for state and 
local offices were not gifts.
229
  However, the Tax Court’s holding went 
beyond the application of the ordinary course of business exception and 
held that the gift tax never was intended to encompass political 
contributions.
230
  This case, according to the court, presented 
circumstances in which a literal reading of a statute was “at war with its 
purpose and history.”
231
  In the court’s opinion, the legislative history of 
the gift tax reenactment in 1932 evidenced that Congress contemplated 
cases that, “despite the literal words of the statute and considering all the 




In contrast, in Dupont v. United States, a federal district court held 
that a contribution to a New York corporation formed to preserve private 
enterprise, private property, private initiative, and American 
independence was taxable for gift tax purposes.
233
  The taxpayer asserted 
                                                          
 225.  Comm’r v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306 (1945); see also Wells Fargo Bank N.M., N.A., v. 
United States, 319 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 226.  Dickman v. Comm’r, 465 U.S. 330, 334 n.4 (1984).   
 227.  The statutory exclusion for transfers to political organizations was enacted in 1975.  See 
supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
 228.  304 F. Supp. 376, 378–80 (E.D. La. 1969) aff’d. 436 F.2d 1327, 1330 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 229.  71 T.C. 252, 263–64 (1978) aff’d. 641 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981). 
 230.  Id. at 257.  The nature of political contributions belies their categorization as gifts because 
such contributions are intended to advance a campaign and not to personally benefit a candidate, 
particularly those candidates who were not the natural objects of the donors’ bounty.  Id. at 257, 259.  
The contributions were made to “promote the social framework . . . [and] social structure most 
conducive to his economic aspirations . . . .”  Id. at 258. 
 231.  Id. at 262–63 (citing to H.R. REP. NO. 72-708, at 502 (1932)). 
 232.  Id. at 263 (citing to H.R. REP. NO. 72-708, at 502 (1932)). 
 233.  97 F. Supp. 944, 946 (D. Del. 1951).  
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the contribution was not a gift but a payment for services to be rendered 
by experts in monetary, business, and political conditions in the United 
States and elsewhere.
234
  The court disagreed with the taxpayer’s 
categorization of the payment and emphasized that the consideration 
claimed by the taxpayer in exchange for the payment was not reducible 
to money’s worth.
235
  The fact that any benefit derived by the taxpayer 
from the payment was enjoyed not only by the taxpayer but also by every 
citizen in the country made such contributions akin to the transfer of 
funds to a political party that shared his economic views or to a journal 
that shaped public opinion.
236
 
In a 1959 ruling, the I.R.S. took the position that contributions to 
political parties or candidates were subject to gift tax.
237
  The I.R.S. later 
reiterated its position when it announced that it would follow Stern only 
in the Fifth Circuit and that contributions to political parties cannot be 
treated as made to various candidates for purposes of applying the gift 
tax annual exclusion.
238
  In 1982, the I.R.S. stated that it would no longer 
contend that contributions made to political organizations described in 
section 527 prior to May 8, 1974, were subject to gift tax.
239
  However, 
the I.R.S. made clear its position that gratuitous transfers to organizations 
not described in section 527 are subject to gift tax regardless of whether 
such contributions are motivated to advance the donor’s social, political, 
or charitable objectives.
240
  This issue remained dormant until the run-up 




                                                          
 234.  Id. 
 235.  Id. at 946–47. 
 236.  Id. at 947.  
 237.  Rev. Rul. 59-57, 1959-1 C.B. 626. 
 238.  Rev. Rul. 72-583, 1972-2 C.B. 534; Rev. Rul. 72-355, 1972-2 C.B. 532.  See supra note 
217 for a discussion of the gift tax annual exclusion. 
 239.  Rev. Rul. 82-216, 1982-2 C.B. 220. 
 240.  Id.  
 241.  At a 2011 meeting of the American Bar Association, several members revealed that the 
I.R.S. had notified several of their clients that they would be audited for gift tax liability in 
connection with their contributions to section 501(c)(4) organizations.  Ellen P. Aprill, Once and 
Future Gift Taxation of Transfers to Section 501(c)(4) Organizations: Current Law, Constitutional 
Issues, and Policy Considerations, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 289, 291 (2012).  The I.R.S. 
later acknowledged that five donors were undergoing such audits.  Id. at 291–92.  See also Stephanie 
Strom, I.R.S. Moves to Tax Gifts to Groups Active in Politics, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/13/business/13gift.html?_r=0.  After Representative Camp, 
chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, suggested that the timing of the audits appeared 
to be an attempt by the agency to attack constitutionally protected political speech, the I.R.S. soon 
terminated its efforts and indicated that no further examinations of such gift tax issues would be 
undertaken until further notice.  Aprill, supra note 241, at 292–93 (citing to Memorandum from 
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The campaign finance landscape has changed significantly since 
1975 as a result of both legislative changes and Supreme Court decisions.  
In the seminal case of Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court held that the 
regulation of political expenditures could reach only coordinated 
expenditures or expenditures that funded express advocacy.
242
  This 
holding opened the door to increased issue advocacy expenditures by 
political parties—so-called soft money.
243
  However, the passage of the 
McCain-Feingold Act in 2002 resulted in the prohibition of the use of 
soft money by political parties.
244
  As a result, section 527 organizations 
increased in prominence. 
After Buckley, only political organizations that engage in express 
advocacy or that coordinate their activities with a candidate, candidate’s 
committee, or political party are subject to regulation by the Federal 
Election Commission (F.E.C.).
245
  Many activities of section 527 
organizations do not amount to express advocacy and, accordingly, are 
outside the scope of the campaign finance rules.
246
  However, all section 
527 organizations are subject to disclosure requirements, similar to those 
required under the campaign finance rules administered by the I.R.S.
247
 
Campaign practices underwent a sea change as a result of the Court’s 
landmark decision in Citizens United v. FEC.
248
  A far-reaching effect of 
Citizens United was its refusal to sanction statutory restrictions on 
                                                          
Steven T. Miller, Deputy Comm’r for Servs. & Enf’t, Internal Revenue Serv. (July 7, 2011) 
(available at IRS Suspends Exams on Application of Gift Tax to Contributions Made to Some Exempt 
Orgs, 2011 TAX NOTES TODAY 131-18 (2011)); see also AM. BAR ASS’N, COMMENTS OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE ABA EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, COMMITTEE’S TASK FORCE ON 
SECTION 501(C)(4) AND POLITICS  13 (May 25, 2004), 
http://www.abanet.org/tax/pubpolicy/2004/040525exo.pdf (noting that there was no evidence of 
I.R.S. enforcement of the gift tax on donations to §501(c)(4) entities for at least a decade).  
 242.  424 U.S. 1, 44 (1976). 
 243.  The F.E.C.’s approval of a soft money advertisement by the Republican National 
Committee that discussed issues but also criticized President Clinton by name fueled the practice of 
issue advertising and both major parties undertook multi-million dollar issue advertising campaigns 
during the 1996 election cycle.  See Richard Briffault, Symposium, The Political Parties and 
Campaign Finance Reform, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 620, 632 (2000) (citing to F.E.C. Advisory 
Opinion 1995-25 (1995)). 
 244.  The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (The McCain-Feingold Act), Pub. L. No. 
107-155, §101(a), 116 Stat. 81, 82 (2002) (codified at 52 U.S.C. § 30125 (2012)). 
 245.  See supra notes 237–38 and accompanying text.  
 246.  The tax law “encompasses activities that, directly or indirectly, relate to and support any 
aspect of the process of influencing or attempting to influence” the electoral process.  Miriam 
Galston, Symposium, Emerging Constitutional Paradigms and Justifications for Campaign Finance 
Regulation: The Case of 527 Groups, 95 GEO. L.J. 1181, 1192 (2007). 
 247.  I.R.C. § 527(j) (2012).   
 248.  See 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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independent express advocacy expenditures, corporate or otherwise.
249
  
Thus, the ability to regulate expenditures was no longer dependent, as it 
had been since Buckley, on whether expenditures funded either express 
advocacy or, alternatively, were coordinated.  Instead, regulatory power 
is now dependent upon whether or not the expenditures in question are 
independent.  On March 26, 2010, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit held in SpeechNow.org. v. FEC that Citizens United compelled it 
to strike down the contribution limitations imposed on donors to a 
section 527 organization that fell under the definition of a political 
committee.
250
  The court reasoned that the constitutional protection 
afforded by Citizens United to independent political expenditures, 
including express advocacy expenditures, extends to contributions to 
organizations that make such expenditures.
251
  As a result, the Super 
PAC, the colloquial term for a political committee that may receive and 
spend unlimited amounts for independent expenditures, was born.  
Although issue-advocacy section 527 organizations are not considered 
political committees for purposes of the campaign finance law, they are 
subject to the tax code’s reporting and disclosure requirements.
252
  Enter 
social welfare organizations into the political fray.
253
 
Statutory support exists for the position that contributions to section 
501(c)(4) organizations are taxable.  Section 2501(a)(1) imposes a tax on 
transfers of property by gift, and, absent a statutory exclusion or 
deduction, any transfer by gift is subject to tax.  Congress provided a 
deduction for gifts to most section 501(c)(3) organizations and several 
other types of organizations.
254
  Congress’s silence with respect to 
                                                          
 249.  See id. at 360, 365.  
 250.  599 F.3d 686, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
 251.  Id. at 694. 
 252.  See supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
 253.  The political activities of the non-profit sector caught the attention of the I.R.S. as early as 
1995, and the Wall Street Journal saw fit to highlight the extent of such political activities in 1997.  
See REP. TO THE RANKING MEMBER SEN. JAMES M. INHOFFE, U.S. SEN. ENV’T & PUB. WORKS 
COMM., POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS AND THEIR SUPPORTING FOUNDATIONS, 
UPDATE 2008 2 (Sept. 2008).  However, the ability to engage in and finance express advocacy as a 
result of Citizens United and SpeechNow has increased the prominence of such organizations in 
electoral politics.  See generally Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310; SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 686.  
It is not uncommon for § 527 Super PACs to be affiliated with § 501(c)(4) social welfare 
organizations.  For example, President George W. Bush’s advisor Karl Rove was instrumental in the 
formation of American Crossroads, a Super PAC, and its affiliated social welfare organization, 
Crossroads GPS.  See Andrew C. Byrnes & Cortlin H. Lannin, I Went Down to the Crossroads: 
Lifting the Blindfold About the Origin of 501(c)(4) Political Advertisements, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 481, 
500–05 (2011). 
 254.  I.R.C. § 2522(2)–(4) (2012).  
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donations to section 501(c)(4) organizations, in combination with its 
special treatment of contributions to section 527, section 501(c)(3), and 
certain other organizations, can be interpreted, under the principle of 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, to subject donations to section 
501(c)(4) organizations to tax.
255
  Moreover, Congress had plenty of 
notice of the I.R.S.’s position on this issue, and it failed to codify an 
exception for transfers to section 501(c)(4) organizations.  The tax code 
disfavors political contributions in many respects, and the imposition of a 
gift tax on such contributions would not be out of character for 
Congress.
256
  Finally, many transfers that do not contribute to family 
wealth accumulation are taxable—gifts to non-relatives, for example.
257
  
If the purpose of wealth transfer taxes was solely to prevent family 
accumulations of wealth, then Congress could have limited their 
application to transfers that advanced that purpose.  Wealth taxes also 
raise revenue and that objective should not be overlooked. 
Several arguments support an exemption for contributions to section 
501(c)(4) organizations.  First, the codification of an exception for 
donations to section 527 political organizations can be interpreted as 
Congress making explicit what had already been implied and not as a 
change in the law.  Moreover, the limitation of the statutory exclusion to 
donations to section 527 political organizations reflected the practices of 
the times—section 501(c)(4) organizations would not play a significant 
political role for more than three decades.
258
  Additionally, the legislative 
history of the gift tax exemption for contributions to political 
                                                          
 255.  Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a maxim of statutory interpretation that means that 
the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 521 (5th ed. 
1979).  See e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (supporting preemption of 
state law on “a variant of the familiar principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius: Congress’ 
enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that 
reach are not pre-empted”). 
 256.  For example, no deduction is allowed for amounts paid or incurred in “(A) influencing 
legislation, (B) participation in, or intervention in, any political campaign . . . , (C) any attempt to 
influence the general public, or segments thereof, with respect to elections, legislative matters, or 
referendums, or (D) any direct communication with a covered executive branch official . . . .”  I.R.C. 
§ 162(e)(1).  Moreover, dues paid to certain tax-exempt organizations that are allocable to such 
activities are similarly non-deductible.  Id. § 162(e)(3).  Deductions for certain indirect contributions 
to political parties, such as advertising in convention programs and other publications and admission 
costs to dinners and inaugural events are also not deductible.  Id. § 276(a).  Except for banks, 
taxpayers are prohibited from taking bad deductions or losses from worthlessness of debts owed by 
political parties.  Id. § 271. 
 257.  No exception applies for gifts made to non-family members.  See id. §§ 2501; 2503; 2511; 
see also id. § 2513(a) (stating that gifts made to any person other than a spouse are treated as made 
one-half by each spouse if certain requirements are met).  
 258.  See supra notes 237–47 and accompanying text. 
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organizations indicates that Congress did not want the tax system to 
discourage political contributions and that the application of the tax to 




Let us assume that Treasury regulations are issued that apply a per 
residence limitation on the mortgage interest deduction and subject 
contributions to social welfare organizations to the gift tax.  Are either, 
neither, or both of these regulations entitled to Chevron deference?  
Perhaps the Tax Court’s interpretation of the interest deduction provision 
in Sophy is the correct one and perhaps not.  The provision in question 
was enacted in 1987.
260
  It is likely that Congress gave no thought to the 
possibility of unmarried cohabitants living in residences encumbered by 
mortgage debt in excess of the dollar limitation—which in 1987 dollars 
was quite significant.  As discussed above, the statutory language is 
subject to two reasonable but contradictory interpretations.
261
  Most 
likely, this issue would be viewed by a court as one of the innumerable 
issues that were bound to occur in the implementation of the statute, the 
resolution of which Congress handed off to the I.R.S.
262
  Accordingly, 
Chevron deference should be accorded to the regulations. 
With respect to the gift tax issue, the preceding arguments and 
counterarguments
263
 do not consider whether the campaign finance 
statutes and their legislative history support or undermine the I.R.S.’s 
position—a consideration well beyond the scope of this work.  It is 
possible that the intent of Congress with respect to this issue is indeed 
ambiguous; and, if so, that determination should be made without regard 
to whether or not the issue is important and central to campaign practices 
and, thus, would unlikely have been delegated to the I.R.S.  Only after 
such a determination is made should the importance of the issue become 
relevant.  If implicit delegation of authority to the I.R.S. exists, then 
Chevron deference should apply.  If no such delegation took place, then 
                                                          
 259.  See S. REP. NO. 93-1357, at 7502 (1974).  
 260.  See I.R.C. § 163(h). 
 261.  See supra notes 211–15 and accompanying text. 
 262.  On the other hand, it is not inconceivable that a court, because this issue implicated the 
treatment of same-sex couples and the role of tax incentives in effectuating federal housing policy, 
could believe that Congress would not have left its resolution to the agency.  Chief Justice Roberts 
casually dismissed any analogy between section 36B and the tax credit for first-time homebuyers on 
the ground that the latter credit is not central to federal housing policy.  King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 
2480, 2495 n.5 (2015).  It is unlikely that a court would consider the manner in which the mortgage 
interest deduction limitation is applied as central to federal housing policy.   
 263.  See supra notes 254–59 and accompanying text. 
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the Chevron deference is inapplicable, the regulation struck down, and 
the issue sent back to Congress. 
Whether an issue is important should not affect a court’s efforts in 
ascertaining the intent of Congress.  After all, one would and should, 
expect a court to make the same effort to ascertain Congress’s intent in 
both situations described above.  If Congress gave no thought to the 
matter, then whether the policy implications are important or whether the 
I.R.S. has the expertise to effectuate social, housing, and campaign 
finance policies should not be an excuse for a court to divine a non-
existent congressional intent.  If Congress did not speak to the issue and 
did not delegate the authority for an agency to speak on the issue, then 
the regulation should be struck down and the issue returned to Congress.  
Otherwise, the court will have delegated to itself the authority that it 
denied an agency.  Justice Stevens stated that: 
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, 
fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s 
policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left 
open by Congress, the challenge must fail.  In such a case, federal 
judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate 
policy choices made by those who do.  The responsibilities for 
assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle 
between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones: 





B. Standing Revisited 
The Court’s refusal to apply Chevron to the extraordinary cases in 
which the implication of congressional delegation of authority to an 
agency is unwarranted stands in contrast to the Court’s standing 
jurisprudence.  The requirement of standing is a mechanism that 
implements Article III’s limitation of judicial power “to all Cases, in 
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United 
States, and . . . to Controversies to which the United States shall be 
Party . . . .”
265
  In Asarco Inc. v. Kadish, the Court stated that “[a]lthough 
standing in its outer dimensions is a prudential concept to be shaped . . . 
as a matter of sound judicial policy and subject to the control of 
                                                          
 264.  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (quoting Tenn. 
Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)). 
 265.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.   
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Congress, at its core it becomes a constitutional question . . . .”
266
  Except 
in circumstances in which federal taxing and spending power allegedly 
violates the Establishment Clause, taxpayer challenges to federal tax 
decisions will not maintain if the taxpayer alleges no more than a harm 
that the taxpayer has in common with all taxpayers.
267
 
Federal taxpayer standing jurisprudence had its genesis in the 1923 
case of Frothingham v. Mellon.
268
  In that case, a taxpayer alleged that 
the Federal Maternity Act of 1921, by encroaching on areas that were 
traditionally the states’ domain, violated the Tenth Amendment and that 
the federal expenditures under the statute increased her tax bill in 
violation of due process.
269
  The Court denied the taxpayer standing 
stating that the effect of the expenditures on her federal tax liability was 
“so remote, fluctuating and uncertain” and that her interest “in the 
moneys of the treasury” was “shared with millions of others.”
270
  
According to the Court, a party can invoke federal judicial power upon a 
showing “not only that the statute is invalid, but that he has sustained . . . 
some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he 
suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.”
271
  In 
a relatively recent decision, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, the Court 
made clear that Frothingham applies with equal force to taxpayer 
challenges to state tax and spending provisions.
272
 
The Court has been similarly unreceptive to suits brought by 
members of Congress that allege an injury to such members’ lawmaking 
powers.  In Raines v. Byrd, several members of Congress claimed that 
                                                          
 266.  490 U.S. 605, 613 (1989). 
 267.  The Court asserted that the framers adopted the Establishment Clause because they feared 
that “the taxing and spending power would be used to favor one religion over another or to support 
religion in general.”  Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968).  Therefore, the Establishment Clause 
serves as a “specific constitutional limitation” on Congress’s power to tax and spend under Article I, 
section 8.  Id. at 104.  The Flast exception has been limited to challenges to Congress’s power to tax 
and spend.  See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 170 (1974). 
 268.  See 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
 269.  See id. at 479–80.  
 270.  Id. at 487. 
 271.  Id. at 488.  Moreover, the Court, none too persuasively, distinguished this case from 
Crampton v. Zabriskie, which in 1879 held that a local taxpayer action may stand.  101 U.S. 601 
(1879); Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 486–87.  In the Court’s opinion, local taxpayers’ stake in the local 
treasury is direct and immediate, unlike federal taxpayers’ interest in the federal treasury.  See id.  
 272.  547 U.S. 332, 344–45 (2006).  In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that property tax relief and 
a state tax credit granted to the DaimlerChrysler Corp., pursuant to a contract entered into between 
the corporation and the City of Toledo, violated the Commerce Clause.  Id. at 337–39.  After citing 
to various of its precedents, Chief Justice Roberts stated that “[t]he foregoing rationale for rejecting 
federal taxpayer standing applies with undiminished force to state taxpayers.”  Id. at 345. 
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the Line Item Veto Act unconstitutionally rendered their votes on 
appropriation bills less effective.
273
  Despite the fact that the statute 
expressly conferred standing to members of Congress, the Court held 
that such injury was “wholly abstract and widely dispersed” and thus not 
cognizable. 
274
  The Court made clear that Article III barriers to standing 
cannot be removed by a congressional grant of standing.
275
  Justice 
Souter pointedly invoked the separation of powers rationale for the 
denial of standing to members of Congress for alleged institutional 
injuries.
276
  A congressperson’s standing will require an allegation of 
personal injury as opposed to institutional injury.
277
 
Legislators may have standing to challenge executive action in the 
absence of a particularized individual harm if they undertake the 
challenge in a representational capacity.  In a recent federal district court 
case, a committee of the House of Representatives had standing to 
enforce a subpoena issued by the committee to a member of the 
executive branch.
278
  In INS v. Chadha, a federal statute permitting either 
house of Congress to overrule a decision by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service to allow a deportable alien to remain in the United 
States was held unconstitutional upon challenge by the petitioner alien.
279
  
The Ninth Circuit permitted Congress to intervene and defend the 
                                                          
 273.  521 U.S. 811, 816 (1997). 
 274.  Id. at 829.  See also Line Item Veto Act, Pub L. No. 104-130, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 1200, 1211 
(1996).  The Act was subsequently declared unconstitutional in Clinton v. City of New York.  524 
U.S. 417, 449 (1998). 
 275.  Raines, 521 U.S. at 820 n.3.  
 276.  Id. at 832–33 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 277.  In Powell v. McCormack, the standing of Representative Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. was 
based on the injury he alleged from the refusal of other members of Congress to seat him.  395 U.S. 
486, 489 (1969).  The D.C. Circuit, in Shays v. FEC, upheld the standing of two members of 
Congress to challenge the Federal Election Commission’s interpretation of the certain provisions of 
the McCain-Feingold Act.  414 F.3d 76, 82–83 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  The plaintiffs asserted that the 
Federal Election Commission regulations in question were impermissibly liberal and, as a 
consequence, they were injured because of the effect that such regulations would have on the 
behavior of their campaign opponents and donors.  See id. at 83–85.  Members of Congress 
challenged various provisions of the McCain-Feingold Act asserting not injuries to their status as 
members of Congress but injuries due to their candidacy for office.  See McConnell v. FEC, 540 
U.S. 93, 224–30 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 588 U.S. 310 (2010).  The Court 
denied standing to the plaintiffs to challenge several of the provisions of the statute, but such denial 
was not predicated on the status of any of the plaintiffs as members of Congress.  Id.  Instead, the 
Court denied standing on the inability of the plaintiffs to show an injury in fact for certain provisions 
and the inability to show the requested relief would redress the alleged injuries for other provisions.  
Id. 
 278.  Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 55, 
68 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 279.  462 U.S. 919, 928 (1983). 
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constitutionality of the statute.
280
  In affirming this decision, the Court 
stated that “Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a 
statute when an agency of government, as a defendant charged with 
enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that the statute is inapplicable 
or unconstitutional.”
281
  However, because the Court held that the 
petitioner maintained standing in the case, it was not necessary for 
Congress to maintain standing in its own right in order to intervene.
282
 
United States v. Windsor,
283
 the case that struck down the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA), raised standing issues similar to Chadha.  The 
respondent challenged the constitutionality of DOMA after she was 
assessed an estate tax deficiency.
284
  The deficiency arose because the 
respondent, married under state law to a same-sex partner, was not 
deemed married for federal estate tax purposes due to the application of 
DOMA.
285
  The Bipartisan Litigation Advisory Group (BLAG) of the 
House of Representatives petitioned to intervene to defend the statute as 
an interested party after being notified by the Attorney General that the 
Department of Justice would not defend the statute’s constitutionality.
286
  
Because the Court held that the petitioner and respondent maintained 
standing, it did not decide whether BLAG had standing in its own 
right.
287
  Justice Alito, however, believed that BLAG did have standing 
to defend the statute, and he would maintain the standing of a member of 
Congress to defend the constitutionality of any statute provided that the 
member has the institutional imprimatur to do so.
288
  “Accordingly, in the 
narrow category of cases in which a court strikes down an Act of 
                                                          
 280.  See id. at 939–40. 
 281.  Id. at 940 (citing Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206, 210 n.9 (1968); United States v. 
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 305 (1946)). 
 282.  See id. at 935–36, 939–40.  
 283.  133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 284.  Id. at 2682. 
 285.  Id. at 2683.  Property that passes to a surviving spouse is not subject to the federal estate 
tax.  See I.R.C. § 2056 (2012).  After Windsor, it was not unexpected that the Court would prohibit 
state marriage laws from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation.  On June 26, 2015, the 
Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to license a marriage between two people 
of the same sex and to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their 
marriage was lawfully licensed and performed by another state.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. 
Ct. 2584, 2604–05, 2607–08 (2015). 
 286.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684.  The Rules of the House of Representatives formally 
acknowledge and refer to the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group, as such, in connection with its 
function of providing direction to the Office of the General Counsel.  See Rules of the House of 
Representatives, 114th Cong., Rule II.8 (2015), http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/house-rules.pdf.  
 287.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686, 2688.   
 288.  Id. at 2712 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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Congress and the Executive declines to defend the Act, Congress both 




In King v. Burwell, the I.R.S. interpreted the tax credit 
expansively.
290
  Section 36B is not a typical credit provision because the 
availability of the credit has consequences beyond the reduction of a 
taxpayer’s tax liability.  Credit eligibility is a factor in determining 
insurance affordability and, therefore, could trigger the individual 
mandate for a taxpayer.
291
  Moreover, credit eligibility could also trigger 
the employer mandate.
292
  Consequently, standing is not an issue 
because, despite the seemingly taxpayer-favorable nature of the I.R.S. 
regulations, particularized harms could occur to certain taxpayers. 
However, let us assume for the moment that section 36B did nothing 
more than reduce a taxpayer’s tax liability and that the legislation clearly 
reflected the intent of Congress to limit tax credits to enrollees on State 
Exchanges.  Despite the fact that the Court believed the tax credits were 
an integral part of the health insurance reform effort—an extraordinary 
case—no one could maintain standing to challenge the regulations.  The 
fact that such a situation could be resolved through the political process 
does not distinguish it from the situation in King.  If the dissent’s view 
carried the day, then the political process could have been invoked to 
achieve the opposite result.  If Congress did not delegate authority to an 
agency to act in “extraordinary” situations, then the invocation of the 
separation of powers rationale—the same rationale that denies the 
applicability of Chevron—should not depend on whether an agency’s 
illegitimate exercise of power solely benefits taxpayers. 
The Court’s standing jurisprudence may be, in some respects, an 
                                                          
 289.  Id. at 2714.  The Court has made clear that state legislators have standing to bring an action 
in defense of a statute if they are doing so in an official capacity.  The Court held that because state 
law authorized the presiding legislative officers to represent the New Jersey legislature in litigation, 
the Speaker of the General Assembly and the President of the Senate had standing to defend state 
legislation.  Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 81–82 (1987).  The Court denied standing in this case 
because the authority to represent the legislature had passed to parties’ successors in office.  See id. 
at 76–77.  A federal district court recently held that the House of Representatives did have standing 
to challenge the Obama Administration’s use of unappropriated funds to implement portions of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, but did not have standing to challenge delays in the 
statute’s implementation.  See supra note 39. 
 290.  See supra notes 54–73. 
 291.  This is precisely what occurred in King v. Burwell.  135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).  See supra note 
56 and accompanying text.  
 292.  See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text. 
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abdication of Marbury v. Madison.
293
  The “Take Care” Clause is not 
hortatory.  It imposes a duty upon the President— “he shall take Care 
that the Laws be faithfully executed . . . .”
294
  The Court has seen fit to 
create exceptions to its traditional aversion to taxpayer standing.  Under 
Flast v. Cohen, taxpayer standing is maintained for challenges to 
congressional spending and taxing decisions that allegedly violate the 
First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.
295
  According to Flast, the 
Establishment Clause protects an interest important enough to justify an 
exception to the Court’s traditional aversion to taxpayer standing.
 296
  
Flast can be taken as evidence that the Court’s standing jurisprudence is 
rooted more in prudential concerns than Article III constitutional 
impediments. 
Surely the assertion that an agency has not been delegated the power 
to act by Congress raises an issue of sufficient import to overcome the 
standing barriers.  The Court, at a minimum, should grant a member of 
Congress standing to challenge agency action if the agency acted without 
express or implied authority.  If an issue is of such significance—an 
extraordinary case—that it belies congressional delegation of authority to 
an agency to act as it did, then to deny anyone the ability to challenge 
agency action is fundamentally inconsistent with the separation of 
powers foundation for the Court’s refusal to invoke Chevron for the 
resolution of important questions.  Such an exception would apply only 
to “extraordinary” cases and, therefore, would raise few prudential 
concerns. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Whether one believes that the Court deserves praise or criticism for 
its holding in King v. Burwell is, I suspect, based on the result for which 
one hoped.  This was not an easy case of statutory interpretation.  I agree 
with the Court that an implied delegation of authority by Congress to the 
I.R.S. to resolve the issue of tax credit availability was unlikely.  This 
case presented an issue central and critical to the policies underlying the 
legislation and was an issue so obvious that Congress surely intended 
some result.  However, the Court’s reasoning with respect to the 
                                                          
 293.  For a thoughtful critique of the Court’s standing jurisprudence, see Richard A. Epstein, 
Standing and Spending—The Role of Legal and Equitable Principles, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 1 (2001). 
 294.  U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3 (emphasis added). 
 295.  See supra note 267 and accompanying text. 
 296.  Id. 
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application of Chevron in the extraordinary case in which Congress 
retained for itself the resolution of an issue is troubling.  Its reasoning 
appears to offer the courts an excuse to take for itself what Congress 
reserved for itself. 
 
